Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid[1]

Daniel Markovits[2], Austin Strange[3], Dustin Tingley[4]

Abstract: Foreign aid has served as an important policy tool for centuries, yet extant international relations research essentially treats it as a novel, post-World War II phenomenon. We argue that documenting aid-like activities in earlier historical periods helps enrich our understanding of the international political dynamics of giving, which are underappreciated and conceptually underdeveloped in the literature. We introduce a framework that links aid giving to the status quo in world politics, and populate the framework with a diverse set of historical and contemporary cases. Our analysis reveals striking similarities between the ways in which donor governments from diverse regions, historical periods and international systems have utilized aid and other forms of concessional giving to pursue international political goals. It also demonstrates how earlier cases are particularly useful for the study of systemic donor intent. Our findings suggest that by considering aid's pre-Marshall Plan roots, researchers can more effectively link the study of foreign aid to rising power dynamics, international formal and informal hierarchies, and other systemic research agendas in international relations.

[1] For helpful feedback and discussion, we thank participants from the Harvard University Department of Government's International Relations Workshop in April 2017, the Brown University Political Science Department in December 2017, and from anonymous reviewers.
[2] BA Candidate, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, markovid@lafayette.edu
[3] Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University, strange@g.harvard.edu
[4] Professor of Government, Harvard University, dtingley@gov.harvard.edu

1. Introduction

"*Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid.*" --Hans Morgenthau, 1962

Morgenthau (1962)'s treatment of aid as a new phenomenon in international relations embodies a persistent dearth of historical context in contemporary academic and policy debates surrounding foreign assistance. Research on foreign aid typically perceives the Marshall Plan, the celebrated $100 billion (in 2017 constant dollars) European economic reconstruction program put in place by the U.S. after the Second World War, as the birthplace of aid (Wood 1986).[5] This implicit viewpoint was forged among international relations scholars in the years immediately following World War II, and has become increasingly entrenched in subsequent decades (Morgenthau 1962; Mckinley and Little 1977). Even scholars who acknowledge the existence of earlier aid-like activities usually perceive 1945 as a "convenient starting point" for contemporary aid research (Easterly 2002).

However, aid from governments and other non-state actors is not a 20th-century phenomenon in world politics. The historical roots of foreign aid predate the Marshall plan by centuries, even millennia. As anthropologists, historians and sociologists have long pointed out, strategic intergroup gift giving and other forms of exchange between governments and tribes emerged in many primeval societies. Aid and other forms of concessional exchange sometimes even predated routinized diplomacy, commercial agreements, cross-border investment and other types of exchange (Cohen 2001). In particular, pre- and early modern world history contain innumerable examples of how governments from diverse political and geographic environments have employed aid as a strategic tool in geopolitics, often in the context of major power competition.

In this paper we argue that the omission of historical aid giving obscures our contemporary understanding of foreign assistance. We argue that throughout history, aid allocation has often been closely linked to a systemic political status quo, and that this connection is especially visible when earlier episodes of aid are considered. In particular, donors

[5] Exceptions exist, most notably research focused on colonial aid (Eyben 2014) and work that acknowledges the possibility of earlier aid but does not integrate cases into analysis (Hjertholmand and White 2000; Picard and Buss 2009).

have often used aid to restore, maintain or disrupt political status quos in world politics. Moreover, we show how these donor strategies have persisted across both historical and contemporary episodes of aid giving. Drawing on authoritative historical research, we identify and document a set of historical cases across diverse periods and geographies. Our analysis includes aid used for status quo restoration among Greek city states and post-Westphalian Europe. We also describe various instances of status quo maintenance in China, Rome, and elsewhere. Aid to upset the status quo cases include French and British aid to America during the revolutionary period as well as Germany during World War I. To demonstrate how our simple typology of donor interests stretches across different time periods to the current day, we also provide modern analogs for each of these categories.

Our analysis suggests there are important advantages of integrating historical evidence into contemporary aid research. First, though existing aid research is keen to a wide range of economic, political and security factors that motivate donors, it is largely silent on how aid giving serves more fundamental donor objectives with regard to the international system. One result of this development is that research on foreign aid, relative to other foreign policy domains, remains largely disconnected from systemic research agendas in international relations such as rising and declining power dynamics, states' basic orientations towards international order, and the construction and management of formal and informal hierarchies in world politics. In contrast, we will demonstrate that historical cases are ideal for helping fill this gap. Subsequent actions of states help clarify their initial intentions, and earlier instances of aid are thus particularly useful for the difficult challenge of identifying donor intent. In addition, incorporating historical aid giving can help diversify the current empirical record beyond the post-war era, a limited and arguably exceptional sample given historically unprecedented norms created by the incumbent donor community that have linked aid giving to international development and humanitarian initiatives.

Our study has potentially important implications for future research on foreign aid in world politics. Grasping the systemic objectives that often underlie aid provision is arguably as important as ever as new development partners enter the international development arena, and as the incumbent aid regime remains in flux. Indeed, nearly half of all countries worldwide are now aid donors, including 44 states which *themselves* are classified by the World Bank as low- or middle-income countries (Fuchs and Mueller 2017). Concurrently, researchers and decision

makers are grappling to understand the nature and consequences of flows of aid and other kinds of state financing from "emerging" non-Western donors often perceived as challengers to an incumbent, "status quo" aid regime dominated by Western states (Manning 2006; Walz and Ramachandran 2011). Clearly, in addition to specific recipient development and donor objectives spelled out in the literature, aid giving continues to embody states' deeper designs for the international system. A more comprehensive account of aid giving that accounts for earlier periods of world history can help more clearly link aid giving to other international relations research focused on these fundamental objectives in world politics.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, building on existing findings in foreign aid research related to donor political interests and pre-Marshall Plan aid, we develop an argument for using historical cases to better connect aid with systemic politics in international relations. Next, we introduce a framework using a broad definition of foreign aid that enables us to compare contemporary and historical cases in our analysis. The framework connects aid allocation with donors' objectives regarding a regional or international political status quo, and includes a simple typology of three categories of donor intent vis-à-vis the status quo: restoration, maintenance, and disruption. We employ our typology and survey a broad palette of historical and contemporary cases of aid allocation. Finally, we conclude by synthesizing our findings and suggesting ways to further enrich contemporary aid debates and research.

2. Donors, International Politics, and Historical Aid

In this section we argue that while the import of donor interests is widely acknowledged, much of the discussion has focused on specific political goals rather than links between aid and donor intentions regarding the international system. We then discuss how historical aid is even more scarcely covered in the literature, and why inegrating aid from earlier periods can connect aid and systemic politics.

A. Donor Interests and International Politics

Scholars widely recognize aid as a tool used by donor countries to pursue their interests. While Morgenthau described aid as "baffling," the post-war proliferation of this foreign policy

tool was less puzzling for other observers. Around the same period, other scholars recognized that the success of foreign aid, from the perspective of donors, was just as much linked to international politics as it was to recipient development outcomes (Mcguire 1952; Friedman 1958). In subsequent decades, aid scholars have consistently demonstrated how donors use foreign aid to further their political interests, often at the expense of recipient welfare (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000).[6] Indeed, tension between recipient and donor needs has been a ubiquitous feature of the aid literature over the past seven decades (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hoeffler and Outram 2011).

However, the donor side of this discussion has overwhelmingly focused on specific variables that measure donor motivations linked to political, military and economic ends. Political interests include securing UN votes (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008), influencing the political behavior of states serving in international institutional leadership positions (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009), satisfying members of the donor regime's domestic winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), fulfilling donors' moral obligations to the international community (Lumsdaine 1993) and generally competing with rival donors (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Dunning 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016).[7] Militarily, aid has been deployed to maintain regional spheres of influence and alliances (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Younas 2008); invest in states with high levels of military potential (Lebovic 1988). Aid is also used for donor economic needs, such as securing economic and commercial advantages for donor firms (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Thangamani, Xu and Zhong 2011) and more generally responding to domestic foreign economic policy preferences in donor countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Milner and Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2015).[8] While donors differ significantly in their propensity to pursue each of these specific interests (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Berthélemy 2006), this stockpile of evidence forcefully demonstrates how donors use aid in pursuit of specific political, military and economic objectives.[9]

[6] Others have recognized aid as but one of many forms of economic statecraft (Baldwin 1985).
[7] Further examples include the discussion of whether traditional western donor states prefer to proffer aid to autocratic or democratic regimes (Kono and Montinola 2009) and the extent to which corruption may (Bodenstein and Faust 2017) may or may not (Alesina and Werder 1999) affect aid flows.
[8] Even multilateral donors deliver aid in ways that reflect their interests, which often reflect the national interests of their constituent donors (Kilby 2006; Stone 2010; Vreeland and Dreher 2014).
[9] Moreover, while there is a large body of research connecting aid with the political status quo, much of this research focuses on politics within recipient societies rather than international politics. This explores the potential effects of

This body of evidence, though extremely insightful, says little regarding donors' systemic preferences in international politics.[10] As others have previously pointed out, research on aid remains relatively disconnected from donor motivations with regard to the international system (Hattori 2001). On the one hand, scholars have explored major shifts in the provision of aid based on donor security interests, including interstate competition during the Cold War and the reorientation of aid in line with donor interests in fighting terrorism (Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Hook and Zhang 1998; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Dunning 2004; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Bapat 2011; Tuman, Strand and Shirali 2017).[11] On the other hand, while both inter-donor competition and the effect of aid on the status quo are existing topics of inquiry, conversations are heavily focused on the implications of these dynamics for recipient development and the incumbent international development regime rather than implications for international politics (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore 2006; De Mesquita and Smith 2009; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler 2015; Hernandez 2017; Swedlund 2017; Annen and Moers 2016).

Its disconnect from systemic politics separates the aid literature from research on other instruments of foreign policy, for which analysis of state systemic objectives using historical cases has proved fruitful. Consider research on state preferences and posture towards the international status quo. In measuring state intentions regarding the status quo international system, scholars rely heavily on studying the military, economic and other material spending and capabilities of established and rising powers (Morgenthau 1948; Gilpin 1981). They also leverage selection into and behavior during territorial disputes (Weiner 1971), alliance formation politics (Organski and Kugler 1980; Schweller 1994), state preferences for systemic polarity (Wohlforth 2009), international economic cooperation (Carr 1940; Brawley 1993), and participation in international institutions (Johnston 2003) as measures of posture towards the

---

foreign aid on political stability (Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010; Bader 2015) and social stability more generally, such as levels of violent conflict (Savun and Tirone 2011; Nielsen et al. 2011; Dube and Naidu 2015; Bermeo 2016; Strange et al. 2017).

[10] There are a few exceptions, such as Roeder (1985), Fariss and Meernik (2013), Boutton and Carter (2014) and Zimmerman (2016), who implicitly or explicitly link aid giving to systemic international politics. An additional exception includes discussions of the impact of the United States' role as a global hegemon and its rivalry with Russia on its Cold War aid policies (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Dunning 2004). Outside of the US, scholars of Japan's foreign aid program have linked Japanese foreign aid to Tokyo's international ambitions. Japan's foreign aid provision has been used as an indicator of its international leadership and preference to maintain a capitalist world order in which Japan's economy plays a prominent role (Rix 1989; Chan 1992; Tuman, Strand and Emmert 2009).

[11] Others have argued that the post-Cold War shift away from strategic interests has made aid more effective (Bearce and Tirone 2010).

status quo.[12] Each of these foreign polciy domains provide scholars with tangible metrics for gauging states' systemic preferences, that is, whether states prefer to accept, maintain, challenge or revise the international political status quo. Foreign aid research is essentially removed from these areas of inquiry.

Similarly, foreign aid scholarship also has had relatively little to say, for instance, about how aid relates to existing formal or informal hierarchies in international relations (Nexon and Wright 2007; Lake 2009; Mattern and Zarakol 2016), or dynamics between rising and declining powers.[13] Instead, foreign aid research has approached, but not directly broached, such questions of states' deeper political objectives.[14] But even this peripheral work is largely focused on the implications of non-Western aid for recipient societies and the international development regime, an important but partial slice of the international system.[15] In contrast, researchers have explored the deeper political motivations of Chinese security behavior, military expenditures, participation in international institutions, and diplomatic activities (e.g., Johnston 2003; Kastner and Saunders 2012).

B. Pre-Marshall Plan Aid

If scholars have begun to grasp the systemic motivations of aid giving, the same cannot be said for the historical origins of aid, which remain utterly absent from contemporary research.[16] For instance, we examined. As the table in the Appendix 1 illustrates, hardly any of the most influential research on foreign aid covers pre-World War II instances of aid allocation. As with its neglect of systemic donor interests discussed above, aid scholarship's neglect of pre-war cases is unique: Other areas of IR such as interstate conflict, crisis bargaining, and

[12] Scholars differ considerably in their definitions of what it means for states to be revisionist or status quo. For a summary, see Lyall (2005); Johnston (2003); and Katzenstein and Sil (2008).
[13] Scholars of systemic politics have often invoked aid, such as military assistance, in their research. In Lake (2009)'s transactional view of hierarchy, military and other forms of assistance are crucial pillars of order that a dominant state must ensure in exchange for legitimacy. Cooley and Nexon (2013) argue that military assistance is one form of binding strategies that enable dominant states to preserve international hierarchies through both cognitive and material signals to leaders of other states.
[14] For example, a recent set of papers explores the popular and controversial "rogue donor" narrative applied to China and other non-Western donors (Naím 2007; Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al. 2017a).
[15] One potential exception is empirical analyses on whether China has a strategic affinity for authoritarian regimes potentially rooted in a challenge to the western liberal democratic order, or whether its aid may have systemically corrosive effects even if unintentional (Bader 2015; Kilama 2016; Hernandez 2017; Swedlund 2017).
[16] Historians have also highlighted this point, for instance, by exploring the deeper geopolitics of Cold War foreign aid provision and conceptualizing aid as a tool of geopolitics for emerging economies like India and China (Engerman 2018).

transnational trade and investment, leverage historical cases much more frequently (e.g., Copeland 2014). Of particular relevance for this paper, the study of systemic preferences vis-à-vis the international system relies heavily on historical cases from pre-1945 periods to assess theoretical claims (e.g., Carr 1940; Weiner 1971; Organski and Kugler 1980; Schweller 1994; Davidson 2002; Lyall 2005).[17]

Yet research in other areas of social science overwhelmingly suggests that political science has omitted a long historical record in which international political actors have employed aid as a policy tool across diverse historical eras and regions. Indeed, aid in the form of exchanges between leaders and envoys of gifts and other concessional items and gestures has been an integral feature of diplomacy for millennia (Cohen 2001). In some pre-modern societies, such as pre-Columbian America and pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, intergroup gift giving emerged long before diplomatic ritual appeared. Aid's longevity may in part be due to its unique expression of reciprocity. Mauss (1967) famously argued that gift giving preceded other modes of international exchange such as trade and investment because the international system was one of "primitive anarchy" that could best be attenuated by a socially constructed norm of reciprocity that was easily understood across different groups and cultural contexts. This makes gift giving transactions moral acts that carry a sacred obligation to give and receive. From this perspective, all forms of government-financed giving, including concessional aid, are inherently political to the extent they carry a built-in expectation of some type of reciprocity, in one form or another.[18] These features have made aid particularly effective for maintaining important political relationships. Sahlins (1965) argues that rejecting or breaking gift exchange relationships is an important signal of shifting hierarchy or status between donors and recipients.

Scholars have since adapted these broad gift-based arguments specifically to foreign aid (e.g., Hattori 2001; Dillon 2017). Hattori (2001: 633-635) interprets aid as "symbolic domination or a practice of signaling and euphemizing a social hierarchy" during which "…recipients

[17] Data availability is admittedly part of the problem. Relative to other IR phenomenon, the empirical study of foreign aid typically relies on data over a much shorter time period: 1950 to the present day. In contrast, thanks to initiatives such as the Correlates of War project, international relations scholars are able to leverage data on militarized interstate disputes, state membership in the international system, interstate alliances, national capabilities, bilateral trade volumes, and participation in international organizations that dates to 1816. That said, even qualitative IR scholars not dependent on large-N, cross-national datasets have rarely employed case studies predating World War II.

[18] Mauss (1967) describes "presation" as gifts given by one group to another, whether in the form of in-kind material goods, peoples, services, feasts or rituals. Gifts, regardless of form, are "given and repaid under obligation" and thus reflect the broader state of relations between groups, including states.

become complicit in the existing order that enables donors to give in the first place." Hattori (2003) argues that the most modern foreign aid can be conceptualized as an unreciprocated gift that reflects and reinforces hierarchical relations.

Both of these gaps in the literature---the systemic drivers of aid and historical antecedents of contemporary aid giving---can be mitigated by bringing in historical cases. Beyond helping fill these gaps, accounting for pre-Marshall Plan aid provides a number of additional advantages. First, studying donor intent is an elusive challenge in contemporary research and is the subject of innumerable scholarly inquiries, including some of the most influential papers in aid scholarship (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000). On average, older cases may be less politically sensitive and further removed from current politics. As such, more accurate and complete empirical evidence on donor motivations may be available through archives or other historical sources, as has been observed in other domains (Stoler 2002). For example, as discussed below, German attempts to buttress Ottoman military strength can be better interpreted in light of Germany's later reliance on that strength during the First World War. Similarly, an ex post analysis of China's tributary system reveals a long-running practice of maintaining China's regional hegemony while avoiding the tradeoffs inherent to physically occupying neighboring territories. In short, subsequent actions of states help to clarify their initial intentions.[19]

In addition, studying historical cases provides a range of added methodological and empirical benefits. Historical analysis widens empirical foundations for theory testing and increases the number of available cases for comparing different phenomena and categories therein (Fioeretos 2011). Moreover, examining earlier cases may help mitigate selection bias if post-1945 foreign aid is exceptional from, rather than representative of, aid in other periods. If this were the case, then contemporary aid research that omits earlier aid activities potentially risks misrepresenting, or missing altogether, the underlying political motivations of foreign aid provision. An area of concern in this regard is the construction of altruistic humanitarian norms around foreign aid after World War II. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, with even earlier roots in colonial era aid, foreign aid grew into a foreign policy tool distinct from other ones such as military development and the use of force, diplomatic activities, and various foreign economic policies (e.g., Lumsdaine 1993). Specifically, for much of the post-war period foreign aid has

[19] Similarly, contemporary incentives for obfuscating aid intent were often less potent in earlier eras. Prior to World War II, historically regional or international communities had not yet developed widely accepted formal or informal humanitarian norms about aid and development.

been partially conceptualized as a vehicle for international humanitarian objectives, not simply a means for donor ends, and certainly much less an instrument for states to influence the international status quo or order.[20]

3. Aid and the Status Quo: A Framework

In this section we introduce a framework to analyze how historical and contemporary donors have used aid in relation to a status quo in international politics. We first offer a definition of aid that enables comparisons of historical and analogous contemporary cases. We then conceptualize aid provision based on systemic donor motivations, and populate the framework using historical and post-war examples.

A. Defining Foreign Aid

An obvious concern with integration of historical and contemporary aid giving is ensuring measurement validity over distinct time periods (Adcock and Collier 2001). Formal definitions of aid were not developed until 1969 and have been continuously refined since (Führer 1994). As one of our primary objectives is to demonstrate how historical and contemporary donors use aid similarly, and as historical cases have largely been omitted from analyses to date, we adopt an inclusive definition of aid. We consider aid as resources transferred from one government to another foreign government on concessional terms that attempt to accomplish a foreign policy objective of the aid-granting government.[21]

This definition is considerably broader than formal definitions of development assistance, such as the OECD's definition of official development assistance (ODA).[22] We prefer this

[20] Of course, humanitarian aid--even aid used for disaster relief---is also highly political and sensitive to donor interests (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Strömberg 2007). Many of the most cited scholarly works on the subject have correspondingly discussed the balance between humanitarian objectives and realpolitik for either specific countries (Brown et al. 1994) or have assumed humanitarian or development goals more generally (Moyo 2009) .

[21] This, of course, does not mean that we attempt to empirically capture every recorded instance of foreign aid. Rather, we populate our below framework with a sizeable handful of representative cases for each category, ensuring historical and geographic diversity and avoiding validating any categories with only a single case or cases from a single region or period. When possible, we also attempt to triangulate between multiple sources for single cases to mitigate problems of historical selection bias (Lustick 1996).

[22] To qualify as ODA, a given financial flow from a donor government must have both have a minimum level of concessionality (meaning a 25 percent or higher grant element) as well as be primarily intended, at least nominally, for development in the recipient country.

general definition since ODA was only institutionalized after World War II and we are interested in incorporating earlier cases of aid giving.

More specifically, our definition is intentionally broad across three dimensions. First, we include aid across diverse issue domains and sectors, such as humanitarian and military aid. Second, we consider aid flows transferred through various channels, including direct cash and other material resource transfers such as in-kind aid, but also aid in the form of training and other services delivered by individuals of the donor government. Third, we include a broad palette of actors as potential donors and recipients. While we exclude independent non-state actors as donors, we allow for foreign aid provided by private entities closely aligned with the states they represent, including state-owned or states influenced enterprises - providing sufficient evidence exists that they were acting on behalf of a state. Similarly, we include rebel groups and dissident political factions in our aid recipient definition. We justify this decision by drawing on literature addressing the targeting of aid to specific intra-governmental factions and sectors (e.g., Pack and Pack 1993). In the context of assessing past aid, establishing a definition that is sufficiently broad to allow for sub-categorization and to avoid omitting pertinent historic examples is the first step towards assessing the full body of aid-related evidence. That said, in order to reasonably bound our study and identify potential historical cases most relevant for systemic international politics, we do not consider private aid or other forms of aid given by non-state actors.

B. Defining and Applying Aid Categories through History

Having established a conceptual definition of aid, we introduce three sub-categories of donor intent that link aid and systemic politics. Broadly, aid giving can be described as falling into one of three categories: status quo restoring (SQR), status quo maintaining (SQM), and status-quo upsetting (SQU).[23] Below we define each of these sub-categories and populate each with historical examples and modern analogues. A brief summary of our framework as well as a list of historical and contemporary cases used in our analysis is provided in Table 1 below. Appendix 2 briefly outlines additional cases referenced in the table but not discussed herein.

[23] Alternatively, one could classify aid based on method (i.e., the precise instrument that is used). Classifying based upon method is certainly simpler, as it is clear whether a nation has provided aid in the form of military advisors or through financial assistance. But this approach offers little in terms of demystifying basic donor intent.

Table 1: A Framework of Aid Intent Regarding the Status Quo

Status Quo Category	Description	Orientation	Donor Features	Historical Examples	Modern Examples
Restoration	Aid in response to a sudden stimulus intended to prevent a drastic systemic change before it happens	Reactive	Vested interests in a particular region, ability to respond quickly	US aid to Venezuela, Athenian aid to Sparta, French aid to Protestant states, US humanitarian aid (WWI), British aid to Portugal	US aid to Indonesia, International aid to Haiti, International aid to Japan
Maintenance	Aid to preserve an international status quo, often given over long period of time by powerful actors, such as aid to prevent internally unpopular regimes from collapsing or bolster an ally against hostile neighbors.	Preventive	Politically stable, bureaucratically complex	Roman border aid, German aid to Ottomans, China's Tributary System, British aid to Indian States, Dawes/Young Plan, US food aid (turn of 20th century)	US aid to Mubarak, PRC aid to North Korea, US aid to Saudi Arabia
Disruption	Aggressive giving intended to undermine an existing status quo, whether rapidly or gradually. Often more likely to be military. More likely for recipients on either side to skirt the definition of "states"	Proactive	Aggressive, dissatisfied with status quo	Haitian aid to Bolivar, German aid to Irish Rebels, French aid to US Revolutionaries, German aid to Italy, French aid to Tipu	Russian aid to Ukranian rebels

I. Aid to Restore the Status Quo

Status quo restoring (SQR) aid is aid offered in the aftermath of a sudden, destabilizing shock that threatens a previously stable international political equilibrium. Historically, one of the most common sources of such a shock has been a natural disaster. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, and tsunamis often occur absent warning—particularly in earlier historical eras—and cause sudden, unexpected shocks that destabilized economic and political balances between groups of states. As in modern times, historical politics surrounding the acceptance of post-shock aid were complex (Nelson 2010). Analogous to modern concerns by recipients about "neo-colonialism," recipients have historically similarly feared of loss of sovereignty resulting from post-disaster aid (Carnegie and Dolan 2017). Donors provide status quo restoring aid in reactive fashion, responding to unexpected shocks to a previously stable systemic status quo.

The record of status-restoring foreign aid traces deep into pre-modern history. The ancient Greek city-states provide an early example. In 464 BC, an earthquake of such magnitude that it was labelled by the historian Plutarch as the greatest yet recorded, devastated Sparta, inflicting serious damage upon its social, political and military infrastructure. In providing an opening for rebel serfs known as Helots to launch an open revolt against Spartan rule, the earthquake threatened a systemic status quo among Greek city states previously ensured by a robust military alliance between several states including Athens and Sparta (French 1955). According to Thucydides (1985), the Spartans relied heavily on Athenian disaster relief aid, and Athens quickly dispatched 4,000 troops and engineers.[24]

Status quo restoring aid was also used in 18th century Europe, and was largely unsuccessful. In 1755 the Portuguese capital of Lisbon was devastated by an earthquake that is estimated to have approached a 9 on the moment magnitude scale. The damage to the city itself and to the Portuguese economy was instantaneous and catastrophic. The international response was equally forceful, mostly because Portugal played a role in the European balance of power and the earthquake's immense destruction created a temporary threat of disruption to European geopolitics in the form of major power conflict. The earthquake took place the year before the

[24] In a demonstration of the complex politics of aid, this Athenian expedition, despite being initially solicited, was turned away due in part to the ideological and geopolitical tensions that would shortly push Athens and Sparta to war.

outbreak of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France (with Portugal siding with Britain). Eventual belligerents on both sides of the conflict sent aid to the stricken Portuguese nation designed to stabilize the disaster-stricken nation and restore a peaceful international environment. Aid included the provision of advisors, both architectural and political, and of re-building supplies and direct financial assistance (Araújo 2006).[25] The British Parliament, with the support of King George II, voted on an aid package within two weeks of the earthquake itself.[26]

The United States has historically provided SQR aid on multiple occasions. For instance, while it had periodically expressed sympathy for revolutionary republics in South America during the 18th century, the US had largely refrained from intervening. However, when a devastating earthquake struck Venezuela in 1812, the US government provided humanitarian aid to the fledgling first Venezuelan Republic in sympathy with that putative state's rebellion against Spain. Described as "the first foreign aid" bill, this aid effort provided $1 million (in constant 2018 dollars) for the purchase of food aid to feed victims of the earthquake. Though much of American aid eventually fell into the hands of Spanish forces, the intent of this giving was clear: to provide humanitarian assistance to an ideologically aligned state felled by a substantial natural disaster.[27]

Not all SQR aid has come in response to natural disasters. A century after its provision of aid to Venezuela, in 1917 the US formally entered the First World War on the side of the Allied Powers. Yet as early as 1914 the US began providing extensive assistance in Europe to help blunt the humanitarian effects of man-made calamities. The German invasion of Belgium in 1914, and the highly publicized human suffering that ensured produced an exceptional outpouring of public sympathy in the United States. Within months of the first reports of conflict, massive quantities of food aid began flowing from the US to Europe. While a substantial portion of this aid was privately organized and financed, such efforts evolved into the US Food Administration and the American Relief Administration, official government bodies

[25] An interesting path for future exploration would be to consider how much was aid in the Greek/Portugal cases about making sure elites stayed in power versus making sure damaged societies prospered to remain valuable strategic/economic partners.

[26] Though it failed to restore the status quo, British aid to Portugal also seems to have been highly successful from Lisbon's perspective: Portugal experienced an economic renewal in the aftermath of the 1755 earthquake (Pereira 2009).

[27] The geopolitical impact of the earthquake itself can be seen in the fact that many historians of the period attribute the final collapse of the first Venezuelan Republic to the destruction in its wake (Altez 2010).

charged, in part, with feeding and otherwise provisioning those made destitute by the First World War and, later, the upheavals resulting from the Russian Revolution.

Status quo restoring aid, particularly in response to sudden shocks, has persisted into the contemporary period, though is arguably less salient for status quo politics. Recent examples include a wide range of strategically motivated US humanitarian responses to calamities in the later half of the 20th century (Drury et al. 2005). Following the devastating 2010 Haitian earthquake, the US and the EU played vital roles in coordinating and directly providing emergency humanitarian assistance (Brattberg & Sundelius 2011), even as a complex web of NGO's attempted their own relief efforts. However, the geopolitical significance of these modern cases is dampened by technological and economic advances of recent years. In modern times, states important to regional or international status quos are generally less severely affected by natural disasters then they would have been centuries ago. Factors like increased state capacity, relative reductions in absolute poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2007) and both short (Whybark 2007) and long-term improvements in disaster relief capabilities even in poor countries mean that the stakes of such aid may be lower today than in the past. Whereas the Spartan and Venezuelan earthquakes struck states with minimal food reserves or infrastructures in the midst of conflicts, modern analogues have tended to afflict countries with far greater capacities and less need to imminently field armies to restore status quo order.

II. Aid to Maintain the Status Quo

While status quo-restoring aid is reactive to a systemic disruption, status quo maintaining (SQM) aid is instead largely preventative. Specifically, it refers to aid designed to avoid systemic shocks and maintain a regional or international status quo acceptable to a donor government. SQM aid often has greater longevity as a policy instrument since donors view it as an important tool for maintaing stability over extended periods of time. Correspondingly, historical aid of this nature has often been the province of empires, formal or informal, and states with stable regimes capable of long-term financing and planning.

Ancient Rome, given its longevity and vast, often fluid borders, provides an exemplary example of SQM aid. Scholars have long recognized Rome as an early example of a regional hegemon interested in maintaining the geo-political status quo (Wilkinson 1999). One of its

principle tools for securing the Roman Border, which became an entire arena of Roman policy governing the so-called "limes," (Isaac 1988) was a series of payments to other governments and frontier tribes.[28] While such policies originated in the Republican and early imperial periods, including payments detailed in Caesar's account of the Gallic Wars (Gilliver 2004, 43), the policy of using financial resources to secure the frontiers became even more institutionalized following the reign of Augustus (Gordon 1949) when Roman expansion slowed and policy shifted towards consolidation.

Germanic tribes were some of the largest recipients of Roman aid transfers. Throughout its duration, the Empire made several attempts to permanently seize Germanic territory but were repeatedly rebuffed. Given this lack of success, Rome periodically settled into a holding pattern wherein the government's primary goal was to prevent incursions on their borders. Financial assistance was a primary instrument of this policy. The historian Tacitus remarked that the German defense of their "liberty" through repeated rebellions and incursions made them a more dangerous opponent than the eastern Empire of Persia, necessitating the recruitment of local allies which Rome, from the perspective of Tacitus, "seldom assist(s) with our arms, but frequently with our money." (Tacitus 1897). Specific instances of this policy include: payments to sympathetic chieftains as well the provision of arms and equipment to those fighting factions hostile to Rome (Gordon 1949). Crucially, these instances of aid provision all occurred in the relative long-term, enduring for decades or even centuries. Roman aid of this form was intended to defend or buttress existing borders and quash threats before they emerge, not to acquire new territory.[29]

Another prominent (and controversial) historical example of SQM aid can be found in the long-term diplomatic relationships between imperial China and its so-called tributary states. Despite its popularity among scholars and pundits, the "tributary system" in practice was less of a cohesive foreign policy structure than a set of largely independent bilateral diplomatic and economic relationships between the Chinese empire and foreign countries (Fairbank and Teng 1941; Fletcher 1968; Rossabi 1983; Mancall 1984; Deng 1997; Kang 2010; Perdue 2015). In

[28] Importantly, not all payments fall under our foreign aid typology: we exclude explicitly extortive payments or minor bribes to individuals and focus on transfers intended to achieve long-term strategic effect.

[29] Non-Germanic instances of SQM aid occurred as well, such as those related to the celebrated revolt of Boadicea, which is thought by some historians to have been precipitated by the confiscation of previously paid subsidies that were intended to buttress friendly local factions (Gordon 1949). There is also some evidence that Roman payments may have played a role in economic development. Roman payments of precious metals helped transform the economy of Germania (Gordon 1949), making it more compatible with Rome's.

particular, Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) emperors and their officials maintained tribute relations with neighboring countries, often running at an economic loss and creating severe debt issues for Chinese officials responsible for receiving tribute missions, to nominally maintain China's superior political position in the region. In particular, China's imperial court was known for giving larger gifts than it received, and trade associated with tribute visits was not taxed in the early Ming period.[30] The economic margin between China's outward gifting and receipt of foreign gifts was so large, in fact, that some cite it as an important factor in late imperial China's fiscal collapse (Khong 2013; Nakajima 2018).[31]

Chinese tribute was deeply motivated by preservation of the international status quo. Surrounding states including Japan, Korea and Vietnam sent tributary envoys to the reigning Chinese Emperor that facilitated trade and cultural exchange. These exchanges were based on a Confucian notion of "all under heaven" hierarchy in which China's emperor was at the center of both domestic and international politics. This hierarchy, regardless of whether its actual foundations laid in reality or rhetoric, was extremely important for the emperor's domestic legitimacy, during the Ming as well as other Chinese empires (Fletcher 1968; Rossabi 1983; Park 2017). Similarly, tribute and any concessionality that it conferred from China to other entities was only possible through a formal framework in which China's government, namely its emperor, was formally acknowledged as the center of a universal order.[32]

As the Ming Dynasty declined, the Thirty Years War in Central Europe, one of the more destructive conflicts in human history, erupted and provided another snapshot of how powerful governments use aid to uphold a status quo. The conflict centered around a hegemonic struggle between the Hapsburgs and Bourbon France (Nexon 2009). Beginning in 1618 as a Czech reaction to Hapsburg religious maneuverings, the conflict evolved into a larger balance of power struggle in the aftermath of the decisive Hapsburg victory at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, which strengthened the Hapsburg position in much central Europe. As the conflict grew in

[30] Sometimes imperial China's assistance was much more active, though still committed to SQM. For example, the Ming government provided large amounts of assistance in sending military troops to the Kingdom of Korea beginning in 1592 after Japanese invasion (Zheng 2010).

[31] The commitment of certain Chinese emperors, in particular early Ming emperors such as the Hongwu Emperor and Yongle Emperor, parallels the tendencies of these leaders to embark on ambitious foreign policy initiatives—such as Yongle's treasure fleets—to preserve hierarchy (Musgrave and Nexon 2018).

[32] This arrangement was also extremely important to China's tribute counterparts, not only for the often-valuable gifts and trading concessions they received from China after paying tribute, but also for the domestic political security they gained from the exchange (Mi 2014; Lee 2016).

scope and complexity, France begin to provide aid to its religious adversaries, even as it was roiled by internal turmoil.

Indeed, France formally joined the conflict in 1635, but in the preceding years provided substantial financial assistance to various Protestant factions in order to prevent the Habsburgs from achieving a hegemonic position on the continent. This aid provision took several discrete forms, with the sole commonality being that all recipients were anti-Habsburg powers. Pursuant to the 1631 Treaty of Bärwalde, France provided Sweden with 400,000 Reichstalers (about 20% of the Swedish budget and 2% of the French one) annually in exchange for a Swedish promise to keep a 36,000 man army in the field. Similarly, payments to the Dutch state from the Treaty of Compiègne and payments to the Palatinate States were intended to allow those factions to maintain their armies in the field. French assistance was directly responsible for much of the armed resistance to the Hapsburgs for the first phases of the conflict.

Statements by leaders involved with French aid clearly reveal France's intention to use aid to prevent advances by its main geopolitical rival. Cardinal Richelieu, the architect of these policies, elucidated the intentions of French aid when he remarked in private correspondence to French King Louis XIII that "preventing the oppression of the princes in Germany" was vital to French interests and wrote of his wisdom in keeping the "enemies of your State occupied for ten years by the armies of your allies, using your treasury and not your weapons" (Wilson 214, 2010). The armies of several of the main enemies of the Hapsburgs were all at one point financed by Bourbon France prior to direct French intervention in the conflict. This French aid was intended to prevent Hapsburg forces from achieving a hegemonic position in Europe.

In more recent (but pre-20th century) historical periods, nation states have also marshaled aid to maintain an international status quo. One example is Prussia's aid to the declining Ottoman Empire, an entity of such fragility that it was known as the "sick man of Europe" (Çırakman 2002). Yet as one of the Central Powers, the stability of the Ottoman state was of vital interest to its ally, the German Empire. German Kaiser Wilhelm II personally saw the Ottomans as both a vital bulwark against both the Russian Empire (Rogan 2017) and the locus of potential aggression against British colonial possessions in the Middle East, and travelled there on two occasions to proclaim German support for Ottoman and Islamist irredentist goals. As part of the so-called "Berlin-Baghdad Express" (McMeekin 2011), Germany provided significant aid, including German officers and technical experts, intended to uphold and reinforce the military

position of the Ottoman Empire (Demirci 2017).[33] Germany also provided the Ottoman Empire with advanced military materials including early model monoplanes, modern capital ships and artillery batteries. Though Germany's aid strategy ultimately failed when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, its intent was clear: to preserve a powerful counterweight to Britain and Russia in the Middle East.

Status-quo maintaining aid has remained an important dimension of aid provision over past two millennia. Contemporary research on foreign aid acknowledges that aid has been used to prop up various types of regimes (e.g., Kona and Montinola 2009; Bader 2015). One of the most well-known contemporary examples of SQM aid is assistance rendered from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the totalitarian government of North Korea. Despite the North Korean regime's erratic foreign policy behavior, its continued existence is of the utmost importance to the PRC. If the North Korean state were to collapse it would create a flow of potentially millions of starving, unemployed refugees who would flood into China's northeastern Liaoning Province, creating a massive refugee crisis for China (Cha 1999). Moreover, it would create a power vacuum in the Korean peninsula which would likely be filled by South Korea and the United States, both nations that are potential rivals of China in the region. As a result, at least until recently, China has provided sufficient humanitarian aid to ensure the regime remains relatively stable and "effectively finances" North Korea's massive trade deficit (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2009). This parallels the systemic value attached to the Korean peninsula under Mao as well as earlier periods of Chinese history in which Chinese governments have used military and other forms of assistance to maintain a regional status quo by means of a stable Korea.

III. Aid to Upset the Status Quo

A third type of aid involves considerably more ambitious, proactive donor intent. Status quo-upsetting (SQU) aid is assistance proffered by donor states with the goal of disrupting a systemic political status quo, such as by fomenting unrest or promoting antagonism toward other states or international institutions. Given SQU aid's inherently aggressive posture, it often takes

[33] Notable among these experts was General Otto Liman von Sanders, who led a reorganization of the Ottoman military.

the form of military material or hardware targeted for use in aggressive military action.[34] However, this aid category also includes all assistance rendered with the purpose of facilitating aggressive action on the part of the recipient entity, including a wide range of logistical and financial support. SQU assistance often provokes accusations of aggressive or expansionist designs on behalf of the aid-granting power and frequently involves the violation of an adversary state's sovereignty. Crucially, the practitioners of status quo upsetting aid often harbor revisionist intentions towards regional or global status quos.

The Ottoman Empire, as referenced above, was historically a major recipient of aid intended to prevent its collapse. But it was also once a militarily powerful hegemon that provided aid, including assistance intended to disrupt a geopolitical status quo. For much of the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire prosecuted an aggressive, religiously-motivated military campaign designed to wrest control of the Mediterranean from the Spanish Hapsburgs and their oft-reliable allies. This campaign was substantially buttressed by various diplomatic and aid efforts. Chief among these were attempts to cleave various Christian states from various putative anti-Ottoman alliances (including the so-called "Holy League").

The Ottoman alliance with France, which involved several discrete instances of foreign aid, was integral to this effort. While segments of that alliance, such as the mutual exchange of embassies and a certain degree of military cooperation, is characteristic of traditional military cooperation, other aspects more strongly resemble modern foreign aid. For example, the Ottomans paid an estimated 100,000 ducats to France (for context, the cost of the entire Ottoman fleet for operations against Italy was 1,200,000 ducats (Isom-Verhaaren 2011)). In return France provided the city of Toulon as a temporary base for the Ottoman fleet.[35]

The American Revolutionary War also prominently featured SQU aid. When the thirteen colonies in America jointly declared independence in 1776, France was already committed to disrupting British hegemony in North America. To this end, the French government provided substantial aid to the American colonies to help them evict the British.[36] Even before the outbreak of rebellion, France dispatched a secret emissary who arrived in Philadelphia in

[34] This stands in sharp contrast to military SQM aid which is generally intended to serve as a deterrent to state aggression. This is a further example of the failings of method-based aid classification.
[35] This assistance recalls modern foreign aid arrangements which often involve basing rights.
[36] French intentions along these lines date to its humiliating defeat in the Seven Years War, a calamity which cost France its strategic position in North America. before and during the American war against the British Empire. In its aftermath the French foreign minister wrote that "England is the natural enemy of France" and that England would "seek war" with France if it managed to make peace with the colonies (Morton 1997).

December of 1775 to assess the viability of anti-British sentiment in the colonies. After the revolution began in earnest, the putative United States sent several diplomatic commissioners to Paris to request munitions. Diplomatic realities precluded France from formally recognizing the US. However, a range of mechanisms familiar to students of contemporary subversive aid were employed to circumvent such difficulties. French government officials offered financial support for colonists seeking to purchase arms, directly shipped military material past the Royal Navy and into the rebellious colonies, and dispatched military advisors to train the initially amateurish and undisciplined colonial army, the most illustrious of these being Gilbert Du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette (Van Tyne 1925, 21).

The precise causes of the eventual American victory are complex, but French assistance is, for example, estimated to have provided 90% of US armaments at the pivotal Battle of Saratoga. Many of these arms arrived under the auspices of a shell corporation called "Roderigue Hortalez and Company" (Morton 1997) which was organized by a criminal turned French government agent. The company funneled arms and ammunition through French colonies in the Caribbean. Further accentuating the parallels to modern aid, the formal treaty between France and the incipient American States, signed in 1778, had a stated purpose of effecting the "liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute and unlimited of said United States" (Hill 1922, 17), a sharp contrast to the pre-war status quo of a prosperous and strategically vital British colony.[37]

Not 50 years later, after having its American colonies receive substantial SQU aid from France, the U.K. itself began to employ aid of the same nature to weaken a powerful adversary. Though there is evidence of British employment of minimal financial SQM and SQR aid as early as the 14th century (CPH, 1931), by the time of the Napoleonic conflicts in the late 18th century, Britain had dramatically expanded the scope and complexity of its aid provision. By the middle stages of the 1790s Great Britain actively and repeatedly employed subsidies as a form of aid intended to undermine French revolutionary (and later imperial) states. For example, from 1794-1796, England granted £2,500,000 (over $210 million in 2018 dollars) to Frederick William, II, the King of Prussia, in order to facilitate Prussian aggression against France.[38]

[37] More generally, during the late 18th and early 19th centuries Britain and France were locked in an arguably hegemonic conflict that spanned several continents (Gilpin 1988), and SQU aid played an important role therein. One front in this confrontation was the repeated French attempts to undermine British supremacy on the Indian subcontinent, including the leading French ally in the region was the Kingdom of Mysore ruled by the Tipu Sultan.
[38] The argument could be made that British financing of continental adversaries of France was an attempt to maintain the status quo of a monarchic Europe. However, this attempt to restore the status quo ante bellum is

Non-European powers have similarly used SQU aid. Haiti, a deeply impoverished country known today as a serial recipient of aid, proactively deployed it as a policy tool to accomplish idealistic foreign policy objectives in the early 19th century that conflicted with the major regional powers of the time. The Haitian example demonstrates how donors can challenge international ideational or normative status quos in addition to geopolitical ones. In 1804 the conclusion of the Haitian Revolution resulted in an independent Haiti ruled by its formerly enslaved inhabitants (Fischer 2013). Haiti quickly became an ideological and political beacon of both those fighting against slavery and those combatting distant colonial rule. One such revolutionary was Simon Bolivar, the celebrated scourge of Spanish possessions in South America. Haitian President Alexandre Pétion warmly welcomed Bolivar and provided him with the vessels and cannon necessary to affect a return to the stricken Venezuelan Republic. Thousands of Haitian volunteers also joined Bolivar's expedition. Pétion insisted, as a condition of aid, that the nascent Venezuelan Republic would abolish slavery. When Bolivar eventually defeated Spain in South America and brought independence to most of the contemporary nations of that continent, he swiftly abolished slavery.

SQU aid remains an important foreign policy tool for contemporary donors. One recent and notorious example is Russian aid to Eastern European and other states as part of a broader initiative to re-expand its regional and international influence (e.g., Lanoszka 2016). Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has become a global pioneer in de-stabilizing aid, as the Russian government and its subsidiaries have provided funding, materiel and technical support to a host of pro-Russian political parties, states and insurgencies on an increasingly global scale (Smith and Harari 2014). In France, a bank linked to the Russian government has provided in excess of $10 million to the anti-Atlanticist, Russophilic National Front. In the Ukraine, anti-government rebels have been provided with military hardware (including, as alleged by an international report (Joint Investigation Team 2018), the "BUK" surface to air missile that was used to shoot down a Malaysian civilian airliner, technical expertise and financial support

arguably itself de-stabilizing given the establishment of new governments and treaty systems by Napoleonic France and the extent to which this status quo was firmly established over a period of more than a decade.

(Gibney 2015). These actions have the common goal of expanding Russian influence and weakening anti-Russian alliances regionally and internationally.[39]

4. Conclusion

The concept of development assistance that emerged after World War II, and remains the dominant form of aid, has important but neglected pre-20th century antecedents. As we have attempted to show, ignoring these roots omits a rich tapestry of aid giving in world politics. It also circumscribes more fruitful interaction between international relations research on aid and other phenomena, particularly those related to systemic international politics. By sampling a diverse set of foreign aid cases across distinct governments, periods and regions, we have attempted to lay out fundamental but persistent donor intentions regarding the international status quo. Our analysis demonstrates that systemic donor interests pervade not only historical but contemporary aid giving, even in an era featuring relatively strong humanitarian norms around aid as well as precise rules and definitions about what counts as aid. Major powers---whether empires or large states---have been some of the heaviest users of aid throughout history, often employing aid defend or upend systemic orders. That major powers have consistently been the largest aid financiers further buttresses our contention that aid is often closely linked to systemic politics, for which powerful governments are the most consequential actors.

In documenting pre-Marshall Plan aid giving, our objective is thus not simply to point out the omission of these cases in existing literature. Instead, we wish to demonstrate that leveraging these cases helps elucidate deeper international politics that are less visible when only considering the contemporary record. Historical cases provide unique value in leveraging both hindsight and cases from earlier periods in which donor behavior is relatively less affected by international norms. As we alluded to earlier, other areas of IR are studied through historical cases and these cases are often viewed through a post-facto lens. The fact that 1914 Germany was a revisionist power, for example, is easier to see through a post-facto analysis (Levy 1987). Historical analysis of power transition dyads have been used to establish patterns than can be theoretically applied to contemporary analogues. Similar approahces can be pursued for aid

[39] A high-ranking Russian army officer described this strategy as follows: "The use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other-nonmilitary measures" to transform "thriving" adversaries into a "web(s) of chaos, catastrophe and civil war" (Kirchik 2017, 215).

research. For example, if a pattern of foreign aid has been historically likely to predict revisionist behavior, then it possible such an analysis could be adapted and applied on a set of contemporary aid cases.

Of course, our study faces important limitations. We fully acknowledge that there is no empirical way to demonstrate that the selection of cases in this paper comprehensively span the breadth of historical aid. However, they do extend across broad ranges of time, forms of aid, geographic regions and political systems, and we believe they serve to establish the persistence of similar aid-like behaviors across diverse circumstances. A different concern with our empirical approach is may be that our framework is overly broad, rendering comparisons of aid in different periods meaningless. While ensuring a certain level of cross-period measurement consistency is certainly important, given that what exactly constitutes aid is a contentious topic among contemporary governments and practitioners (e.g., Woods 2008), it seems unlikely that our definition is obfuscating a previously clear picture of what aid means to different actors in the international system.

Our findings can help improve future theoretical and empirical research on foreign aid in international relations in multiple ways. First, the bulk of empirical research on donor interests relies on cross-national, time series analyses that often include all developing countries regardless of their strategic significance to a particular donor. Data of this nature is unlikely to fully reveal the nature of donor interests because donors are relatively uninterested in many of the recipients included in these studies. Specifically, future empirical studies could explore whether and how systemic status quo concerns factor heterogeneously into aid allocation decisions. For example, one recent study explores whether recipients with new governments, particularly in countries that are allies to the United States and thus are arguably more relevant for tipping the geopolitical status quo, are politically attractive to China (DiLorenzo and Cheng 2017). Future work could develop strategies for identifying recipients likely to be most relevant for a given donor in terms of restoring, maintaining or disrupting a regional or international status quo.[40]

Second, our historical survey strongly suggests that there is significant research value in escaping narrow definitions of foreign aid when studying potential links between donor interests

[40] For example, many donor aid agencies, such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japanese government's primary aid unit, maintains and updates a list of priority recipients in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that provides an ostensible list of foreign policy priorities (Fuchs et al. 2017).

and aid allocation. Existing studies that integrate both economic and military aid are certainly a positive first step in this regard, yet we lack reliable military aid data for many important donors. Moreover, the proliferation of non-ODA financing by state government such as China and other BRICS donors such as India (Bräutigam 2011; Walz and Ramachandran 2011) provides fodder for adapting a relatively open-ended definition of aid that lowers the risk of omitting key flows that reveal true donor intentions. Our historical cases above perform the same function: they demonstrate that whether or not these various examples would qualify as "aid" under current international standards is perhaps less important than capturing the full extent of concessional donor activities. Doing so can more validly identify deeper donor interests and help further explain the status quo politics of aid allocation.

Of course, integrating historical perspectives into international relations is not a simple task. Scholars will disagree about which historical interpretations are most accurate and valuable, including those regarding the structure of the international system itself (e.g., Buzan and Little 2002). But incorporating history needs to happen for foreign aid and other areas in the field of international relations to more fully capture the fundamental motivations for these phenomena, the longevity of which only becomes visible if earlier periods are considered. What is more, greater appreciation for the systemic dynamics underpinning aid provision can help scholars develop deeper understandings of how these factors interact with other domestic and international interests already covered in the literature (Braumoeller 2008).

References

Abel, T. F. (1938). *Why Hitler came into power*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Acharya, A., Fuzzo De Lima, A. T., & Moore, M. (2006). Proliferation and fragmentation: Transactions costs and the value of aid. *The Journal of Development Studies, 42*(1), 1-21.

Adcock, R. & Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 529-546.

Alesina, A., & Weder, B. (2002). Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? *American Economic Review*, *92*(4), 1126-1137.

Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, *5*(1), 33-63.

Annen, K., & Moers, L. (2016). Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation. *The World Bank Economic Review*, *31*(3), 708-729.

Araújo, A. C. (2006). The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: public distress and political propaganda. *E-journal of Portuguese History* (No. 2). Universidade do Porto/Brown University.

Bader, J. (2015). China, autocratic patron? An empirical investigation of China as a factor in autocratic survival. *International Studies Quarterly*, *59*(1), 23-33.

Baldwin, D. A. (1985). *Economic statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barua, P. P. (2011). Maritime trade, seapower, and the Anglo‐Mysore wars, 1767–1799. *Historian*, *73*(1), 22-40.

Bearce, D. H., & Tirone, D. C. (2010). Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic goals of donor governments. *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(3), 837-851.

Bermeo, S. B. (2016). Aid is not oil: Donor utility, heterogeneous aid, and the aid-democratization relationship. *International Organization*, *70*(1), 1-32.

Berthélemy, J. C. (2006). Bilateral donors' interest vs. recipients' development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same? *Review of Development Economics*, *10*(2), 179-194.

Bodenstein, T., & Faust, J. (2017). Who cares? European public opinion on foreign aid and political conditionality. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *55*(5), 955-973.

Boutton, A., & Carter, D.B. (2014). Fair-weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(7): 1144-1173.

Brattberg, E., & Sundelius, B. (2011). Mobilizing for international disaster relief: Comparing US and EU approaches to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 8*(1).

Braumoeller, B.F. (2008). Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict. *American Political Science Review*102(1): 77-93.

Bräutigam, D. (2011). Aid 'with Chinese characteristics': Chinese foreign aid and development finance meet the OECD‐DAC aid regime. *Journal of International Development*, *23*(5), 752-764.

Brawley, M. R. (1993). *Liberal leadership: Great powers and their challengers in peace and war*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2007). Foreign aid and policy concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *51*(2), 251-284.

Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2009). A political economy of aid. *International Organization*, *63*(2), 309-340.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2016). Competition and collaboration in aid-for-policy deals. *International Studies Quarterly*, *60*(3), 413-426.

Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. *American Economic Review*, *90*(4), 847-868.

Buzan, B., and Little, R. (2002). 10 International systems in world history: remaking the study of international relations. *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (2002): 200.

Carr, E. H. (1940). *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: Reissued with a new preface from Michael Cox*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carnegie, A., & Dolan, L. (2017). The effects of rejecting aid on recipients' reputations: evidence from natural disaster responses. *Working Paper*.

Cha, V. D. (1999). *Alignment despite antagonism: the United States-Korea-Japan security triangle*. Stanford,: Stanford University Press.

Chan, S. (1992). Humanitarianism, mercantilism, or comprehensive security? Disbursement patterns of Japanese foreign aid. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, *19*(1), 3-17.

Chancey, M. K. (2006). The making of the Anglo-Hyderabad alliance, 1788–1823. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, *29*(2), 181-214.

Cohen, R. (2001). The great tradition: The spread of diplomacy in the ancient world. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12(1): 23-38.

Cooley, A. and Nexon D.H. 2013. `The Empire Will Compensate You': The Structural Dynamics of the US Overseas Basing Network. *Perspectives on Politics* 11(4):1034-1050.

Çırakman, A. (2002). *From the "terror of the world" to the "sick man of Europe": European images of Ottoman Empire and society from the sixteenth century to the Nineteenth* (Vol. 43). Bern: Peter Lang.

Copeland, D.C. (2014). *Economic Interdependence and War*. Princeton University Press, 2014.

Davidson, J. W. (2002) The roots of revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39. *Security Studies 11*(4), 125-159.

Demirci, S. (2017). The Dardanelles Campaign and the contending strategies for war. *International Relations*, *5*(5), 258-269.

Deng, K. (1997) The foreign staple trade of China in the premodern era. *The International History Review*, *19*(2). pp. 253-283.

Dillon, Wilton S. (2017). *Gifts and nations: the obligation to give, receive and repay*. Routledge.

DiLorenzo, M., & Cheng, M. (2017). Political turnover and Chinese development cooperation. *Working Paper*.

Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2011). Does terror increase aid? *Public Choice*, *149*(3), 337-363.

Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015). Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, *48*(3), 988-1023.

Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2018). Apples and dragon fruits: the determinants of aid and other forms of state financing from China to Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*.

Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. *Public Choice*, *136*(1-2), 139-164.

Drury, A. C., Olson, R. S., & Belle, D. A. V. (2005). The politics of humanitarian aid: US foreign disaster assistance, 1964–1995. *Journal of Politics*, *67*(2), 454-473.

Dube, O., & Naidu, S. (2015). Bases, bullets, and ballots: The effect of US military aid on political conflict in Colombia. *The Journal of Politics*, *77*(1), 249-267.

Dunning, T. (2004). Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold War politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. *International Organization*, *58*(2), 409-423.

Easterly, W. (2002). The cartel of good intentions: the problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid. *The Journal of Policy Reform*, *5*(4), 223-250.

Engerman, D. C. (2018). *The price of aid: The economic Cold War in India*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Eyben, R. (2014). *International aid and the making of a better world: Reflexive practice*. Routledge.

Fairbank, J.K., and Teng, S.Y. (1941). On the Ch'ing tributary system. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6(2): 135-246.

Fariss, C.J., and Meernik, J.D. (2013). Towards a Causal Test of United States Security Interests and Humanitarian Aid. Working Paper.

Feyzioglu, T., Swaroop, V., & Zhu, M. (1998). A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid. *The World Bank Economic Review*, *12*(1), 29-58.

Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2010). Changing aid regimes? US foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror. *Journal of Development Economics*, *91*(2), 185-197.

Fletcher, J.F. (1968). "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884." In John Fairbank, Ed. *The Chinese World Order*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 206-24.

Friedman, M. (1958). Foreign economic aid: Means and objectives. *The Yale Review*, *47*(4): 500-516.

French, A. (1955). The Spartan earthquake. *Greece & Rome*, *2*(3), 108-118.

Fuchs, A., & Müller, A. (2017). Aid donors. *Working Paper*.

Fuchs, A.; Nunnenkamp, P., & Öhler, H. (2013). Why donors of foreign aid do not coordinate: The role of competition for export markets and political support. *The World Economy*, *38*(2), 255-285

Fuchs, A., Kim, S.Y., & Strange, A.M. (2017). Competition and coexistence: Donor responses to Chinese development finance. *Working Paper*.

Führer, H. (1994). The story of official development assistance: a history of the Development Assistance Committee and the Development Co-operation Directorate in dates, names and figures. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Gibney, M. (2015). The downing of MH17: Russian responsibility? *Human Rights Law Review*, *15*(1), 169-178.

Gilpin, R. (1983). *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gordon, C. D. (1949). Subsidies in Roman imperial defence. *Phoenix*, *3*(2), 60-69.

Hattori, T. (2001). Reconceptualizing foreign aid. *Review of International Political Economy* 8(4): 633-660.

Hattori, T. (2003). The moral politics of foreign aid. *Review of International Studies* 29(2): 229-247.

Hernandez, D. (2017). Are "new" donors challenging world bank conditionality? *World Development*, 96, 529-549.

Hill, C. E. (1922). *Leading american treaties* (Vol. 4). New York: Macmillan.

Hjertholm, P., & White, H. (2000). *Foreign aid in historical perspective*. London: Routledge.

Hoeffler, A., & Outram, V. (2011). Need, merit, or self‐interest—what determines the allocation of aid? *Review of Development Economics*, *15*(2), 237-250.

Hook, S. W., & Zhang, G. (1998). Japan's aid policy since the cold war: rhetoric and reality. *Asian Survey*, *38*(11), 1051-1066.

Isaac, B. (1988). The meaning of the terms limes and limitanei. *The Journal of Roman Studies*, *78*, 125-147.

Joint Investigation Team. (2018). MH17 Air Disaster. Amsterdam: Dutch Federal Prosecution Agency. Retrieved from https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/

Johnston, A. I. (2003). Is China a status quo power? *International Security*, *27*(4), 5-56.

Kang, David C. (2010) *East Asia before the West: Five centuries of trade and tribute*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kastner, S. L., & Saunders, P. C. (2012). Is China a status quo or revisionist state? Leadership travel as an empirical indicator of foreign policy priorities. *International Studies Quarterly*, *56*(1), 163-177.

Katzenstein, P., & Sil, R. (2008). Eclectic theorizing in the study and practice of international relations. In Reus-Smit, C., and Snidal, D. (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Khong, Y.F. (2013). The American Tributary System. *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 6(1): 1-47.

Kilama, E.G. (2016). Evidences on donors competition in Africa: traditional donors versus China. *Journal of International Development* 28(4), 528-551.

Kilby, C. (2006). Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank. *The Review of International Organizations 1*(2), 173-195.

Kono, D.Y., & Montinola, G.R. (2009). Does foreign aid support autocrats, democrats, or both? *The Journal of Politics, 71*(2), 704-718.

Kuziemko, I, & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114(5), 905-930.

Lake, D.A. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.

Lanoszka, A. (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe. *International Affairs* 92(1): 175-195.

Lebovic, J. H. (1988). National interests and US foreign aid: The Carter and Reagan years. *Journal of Peace Research, 25*(2), 115-135.

Levy, J. S. (1987). Declining power and the preventive motivation for war. *World Politics, 40*(1), 82-107.

Licht, A.A. (2010). Coming into money: The impact of foreign aid on leader survival. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1), 58-87.

Lumsdaine, D.H. (1993). *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime*, 1949-1989. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lustick, I.S. (1996). History, historiography, and political science: Multiple historical records and the problem of selection bias. *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 605-618.

Lyall, J. (2005). *Paths of ruin: Why revisionist states arise and die in world politics*. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University.

Maizels, AA., & Nissanke, M.K. (1984). Motivations for aid to developing countries. *World Development 12*(9), 879-900.

Mancall, M. (1984). *China at the center: 300 years of foreign policy*. Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan.

Manning, R. (2006) Will 'emerging donors' change the face of international co‐operation? *Development Policy Review 24*(4), 371-385.

Mattern, J.B. & Zarakol, A. (2016). Hierarchies in World Politics. *International Organization* 70(3): 623-654.

Mauss, M. (1967). *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. New York: Norton.

McGuire, C. (1952). Point four and the national power of the United States. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, *11*(3), 343-356.

McKinlay, R. D., & Little, R. (1977). A foreign policy model of US bilateral aid allocation. *World Politics*, *30*(1), 58-86.

McMeekin, S. (2010). *The Berlin-Baghdad express: the Ottoman Empire and Germany's bid for world power, 1898-1918*. London: Allen Lane.

Meernik, J., Krueger, E.L., & Poe, S.C. (1998) Testing models of US foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War. *The Journal of Politics*, *60*(1), 63-85.

Milner, H.V., & Tingley, D.H. (2010). The political economy of US foreign aid: American legislators and the domestic politics of aid. *Economics & Politics*, *22*(2), 200-232.

Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2015). *Sailing the water's edge: The domestic politics of American foreign policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Morgenthau, H. (1962). A political theory of foreign aid. *American Political Science Review*, *56*(02), 301-309.

Morton, B. (1977). "Roderigue Hortalez" to the Secret Committee: An Unpublished French Policy Statement of 1777. *The French Review*, *50*(6), 875-890.

Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*. New York: Macmillan.

Musgrave, P. & Nexon, D.H. (2018). Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War. *International Organization*: 1-36.

Naím, M. (2007). Rogue aid. *Foreign Policy 159*(March/April), 95–96.

Nakajima, G. (2018). The Structure and Transformation of the Ming Tribute Trade System. In Manuel Perez Garcia and Lucio De Sousa, eds., *Global History and New Polycentric Approaches*. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2018. 137-162.

Nanto, D. K., & Chanlett-Avery, E. (2009). North Korea: Economic leverage and policy analysis. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service.

Nelson, T. (2010). Rejecting the gift horse: international politics of disaster aid refusal. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *10*(3), 379-402.

Nexon, D.H. (2009). *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*. Princeton University Press.

Nexon, D.H. & Wright, T. (2007). What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate. *American Political Science Review* 101(2):253-271.

Nielsen, R.A., Findley, M.G. Davis, Z.S., Candland, T., & Nielson, D.L. (2011). Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict. *American Journal of Political Science, 55*(2), 219-232.

Organski, A.F.K, & Kugler, Jacek. (1980). *The war ledger*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Pack, H., & Pack, J. R. (1993). Foreign aid and the question of fungibility. *The Review of Economics and statistics*, 258-265.

Painter, B. (2005). *Mussolini's Rome: Rebuilding the eternal city*. New York: Macmillan.

Park, S. (2017). Long Live the Tributary System! The Future of Studying East Asian Foreign Relations. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 77(1): 1-20.

Perdue, P. C. (2015). The tenacious tributary system. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *24*(96), 1002-1014.

Pereira, A. S. (2009). The opportunity of a disaster: the economic impact of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. *The Journal of Economic History*, 69(02), 466-499.

Picard, L.A., & Buss, T.F.. (2009) *A fragile balance: re-examining the history of foreign aid, security, and diplomacy*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.

Poe, S.C., & Meernik, J. (1995). US military aid in the 1980s: a global analysis. *Journal of Peace Research 32*(4), 399-411.

Rix, A. (1989). Japan's foreign aid policy: a capacity for leadership? *Pacific Affairs*, *62*(4), 461-475.

Roeder, P.G. (1985). The Ties that Bind: Aid, Trade, and Political Compliance in Soviet-third World Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 29(2): 191-216.

Rogan, E. (2015) *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*. Basic Books.

Rossabi, M. (1983). *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sachs, J. D. (2002). Resolving the debt crisis of low-income countries. *Brookings papers on economic activity*, (1), 257-286.

Sahlins, M. (1965). On the sociology of primitive exchange. *The relevance of models for social anthropology* 139: 236.

Savun, B., & Tirone, D.C. (2011). Foreign aid, democratization, and civil conflict: How does democracy aid affect civil conflict? *American Journal of Political Science 55*(2), 233-246.

Schraeder, P.J., Hook, S.W., & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows. *World Politics 50*(02) , 294-323.

Schweller, R.L. (1994). Bandwagoning for profit: bringing the revisionist state back in. *International Security*, *19*(1), 72-107.

Sloan, G. (2013). The British state and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An intelligence failure or a failure of response? *Intelligence and National Security*, *28*(4), 453-494.

Stone, R.W. (2010). Buying influence: Development aid between the cold war and the war on terror. *Unpublished working paper*.

Stoler, A. L. (2002). Colonial archives and the arts of governance. *Archival science*, *2*(1-2), 87-109.

Strange, A.M., Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., & Tierney, M.J. (2017). Tracking underreported financial flows: China's development finance and the aid–conflict nexus revisited. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61*(5), 935-963.

Strömberg, D. (2007). Natural disasters, economic development, and humanitarian aid. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *21*(3), 199-222.

Swedlund, H.J. (2017). Is China eroding the bargaining power of traditional donors in Africa? *International Affairs,* 93(2), 389-408.

Thangamani, B., Xu, C., & Zhong, C. (2011). The relationship between foreign aid and FDI in South Asian economies. *International Journal of Economics and Finance*, *3*(2), 143.

Thucydides. (1985). The Pelopponnesian War. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Tuman, J.P., Strand, J.R., & Emmert, C.F. (2009). The disbursement pattern of Japanese foreign aid: a reappraisal. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 9*(2), 219-248.

Tuman, J.P., Strand, J.R., & Shirali, M. (2017). Foreign policy alignment with the War on Terror: The case of Japan's foreign aid program. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 17*(3), 343-354.

Van Tyne, C. H. (1925). French aid before the alliance of 1778. *The American Historical Review*, *31*(1), 20-40.

Vreeland, J.R., & Dreher, A. (2014). *The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: money and influence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walz, J., & Ramachandran, V. (2011). Brave new world: a literature review of emerging donors and the changing nature of foreign assistance. *Center for Global Development Working Paper 273.*

Weiner, M. (1971). The Macedonian syndrome an historical model of international relations and political development. *World Politics, 23*(4), 665-683.

Wohlforth, W.C. (2009). Unipolarity, status competition, and great power war. *World Politics, 61*(1), 28-57.

Wood, R. E. (1986). *From Marshall Plan to debt crisis: Foreign aid and development choices in the world economy* (Vol. 15). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance. *International Affairs, 84*(6), 1205-1221.

Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. *European Journal of Political Economy, 24*(3), 661-674.

Zimmermann, A.M. (2016). *US Assistance, Development, and Hierarchy in the Middle East: Aid for Allies*. Springer

Appendix 1: Coverage of Historical Cases in Influential Aid Research

Scholarly articles with more than 100 citations to appear in google scholar search results for the search term "foreign aid assistance, AND aid, OR development". Citation counts as of January 2018.

Article	Citations	Pre-WW2?
Burnside and Dollar 2000	5117	No
Alesina and Dollar 2000	3044	No
Chenery and Strout 1966	2623	No
Boone 1996	1912	No
Collier and Dollar 2002	1610	No
Easterly et al 2004	1441	No
Alesina and Weder 2002	1284	Yes
Easterly 2003	1171	No
Hansen and Tarp 2000	1145	No
Edwards and Hulme 1996	1103	No
Riddel 2009	996	No
Bräutigam and Knack 2004	939	No
Dalgaard et al 2004	926	No
Maizels and Nissanke 1984	763	No
Griffin and Enos 1970	671	No
McKinnon 1964	662	No
Schrader, Hook and Taylor 1998	645	No
Knack 2004	619	No
Morgenthau 1962	570	No
Easterly 2002	557	No
Feyzioglu et al 1998	554	No
Kuziemko and Werker 2006	552	No
Woods 2008	537	No
Berthélemy 2006	499	No
Svensson 2000	485	No

Papanek 1972	479	No
Easterly and Pfutze 2008	424	No
Meernik et al 1998	354	No
Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985	343	No
Dudley and Montmarquette 1976	306	No
Remmer 2004	290	No
Goldsmith 2001	281	No
Pallage and Robe 2001	270	No
Woods 2005	259	No
Noël and Thérien 1995	259	No
Radelet 2006	257	No
Pack and Pack 1993	241	No
Swaroop and Devarajan 1998	180	No
Miller and Tingley 2010	156	No
Opeskin 1996	109	Yes

References in above table not included in main text:

Boone, P. (1996). Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. *European economic review*, *40*(2), 289-329.

Bräutigam, D. A., & Knack, S. (2004). Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic development and cultural change*, *52*(2), 255-285.

Chenery, H. B., & Strout, A. M. (1966). Foreign assistance and economic development. *The American Economic Review*, *56*(4), 679-733.

Cingranelli, D. L., & Pasquarello, T. E. (1985). Human rights practices and the distribution of US foreign aid to Latin American countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 539-563.

Collier, P., & Dollar, D. (2002). Aid allocation and poverty reduction. *European economic review*, *46*(8), 1475-1500.

Dalgaard, C. J., Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2004). On the empirics of foreign aid and growth. *The Economic Journal*, *114*(496), F191-F216.

Dudley, L., & Montmarquette, C. (1976). A model of the supply of bilateral foreign aid. *The American Economic Review*, *66*(1), 132-142.

Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth?. *Journal of economic Perspectives*, *17*(3), 23-48.

Easterly, W., Levine, R., & Roodman, D. (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: comment. *American economic review*, *94*(3), 774-780.

Edwards, M., & Hulme, D. (1996). Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations. *World development*, *24*(6), 961-973.

Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where does the money go? Best and worst practices in foreign aid. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *22*(2), 29-52.

Goldsmith, A. A. (2001). Foreign aid and statehood in Africa. *International organization*, *55*(1), 123-148.

Griffin, K. B., & Enos, J. L. (1970). Foreign assistance: objectives and consequences. *Economic development and cultural change*, *18*(3), 313-327.

Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2001). Aid and growth regressions. *Journal of development Economics*, *64*(2), 547-570.

Knack, S. (2004). Does foreign aid promote democracy?. *International Studies Quarterly*, *48*(1), 251-266.

Noël, A., & Thérien, J. P. (1995). From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign aid. *International organization*, *49*(3), 523-553.

Opeskin, B.R. (1996). The Moral Foundations of Foreign Aid. World Development 24 (January): 21-44.

Pallage, S., & Robe, M. A. (2001). Foreign aid and the business cycle. *Review of International Economics*, *9*(4), 641-672.

Papanek, G. F. (1972). The effect of aid and other resource transfers on savings and growth in less developed countries. *The Economic Journal*, *82*(327), 934-950.

Radelet, S. (2006). A primer on foreign aid. Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 92. Washington, DC: CGD

Remmer, K. L. (2004). Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government?. *American Journal of Political Science*, *48*(1), 77-92.

Riddell, R. C. (2009). 3 does foreign aid work?. *Doing Good or Doing Better*, 47.

Svensson, J. (2000). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. *Journal of development economics*, *61*(1), 61-84.

Swaroop, V., & Devarajan, S. (1999). *The implications of foreign aid fungibility for development assistance*. The World Bank.

Woods, N. (2005). The shifting politics of foreign aid. *International affairs*, *81*(2), 393-409.

Appendix 2: Background of Additional Cases Referenced in Table 1

Status Quo Maintenance Aid

Dawes Plan/Young Plan:

As a half-century of European history showed, Germany was the linchpin of the European status quo for much of the 1900s. In the inter-war era the combination of rising communist sentiment, various economic crises and the disastrous effects of the post-World War I peace settlement left the Weimar government particularly vulnerable to economic crises and exceptionally burdened with debt. Cancelling or re-negotiating excessive sovereign debts is a common, if controversial tool of modern foreign aid (Moyo 2009) that is often applied to debt burdened countries in the global South (Sachs 2002). In 1924 the United States implemented the Dawes Plan which called for a slowed repayment schedule, substantial loans to Germany ($200 million) and the removal of foreign troops from Germany's industrial heartland. This plan was eventually superseded by the Young Plan in 1929 which directly forgave 20% of German debts. These measures were enacted by the still vengeful victors of the First World War because they recognized the precarious nature of the Weimar government and the extent to which a hostile Germany could undermine the European order - an assumption that vindicated by subsequent history.

British Colonial Aid to Indian Rulers

The late colonial period similarly includes abundant examples of SQM aid, primarily in the form of European powers supporting regional potentates to prevent the emergence of potential rivals. One of the most prominent such examples occurred In India, where the British Empire and related proxies paid subsidies and provided military material to a host of native rulers, most notably the Nizam of Hyderabad (Chancey 2006). Until the final British consolidation of control of the Indian subcontinent circa 1860, British forces in India were consistently outnumbered by their native adversaries. Complex webs of local alliances and subsidies were vital to ensuring the survival (Barua 2011) of friendly local potentates and to preventing advances on British territory from multiple geo-political adversaries, including France and several successive alliances of regional warlords. Britain eventually shifted to an offensive strategy in India, absorbing and conquering independent rulers, but for several decades Britain was interested in preserving its position as the dominant, but not absolute power on the subcontinent.[41]

Status Quo Upsetting Aid

[41] This case could be viewed as SQU as it was often used to undermine local potentates and expand British control. However, we believe the goal of this aid was to maintain the broader regional status quo of British dominance of the sub-continent

World War I German Aid to Irish Rebels:

the First World War is widely acknowledged as the locus of an aborted power transition between the German and British Empires, and offers further evidence of how per-Marshall plan donors used aid to challenge an international status quo. Germany attempted to use support for Irish rebels to destabilize and distract Great Britain from the main theaters of conflict. Long a disaffected British territory, Ireland was ripe for rebellion in the early 20th century, and prominent Irish rebels saw the outbreak of the First World War as an excellent opportunity to instigate an open conflict with Britain. On the 24th of August, 1914 the German Ambassador to the United States met with representatives of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and its American counterpart, Clan Na Gael. There, and at further meetings with German officials both in neutral nations and within Germany itself, plans were made for the provision of "arms and munitions" to Irish republican forces. While many of these war materials were intercepted in route by British forces after the war started, as late as 1913 German weapons were arriving unimpeded in Ireland (Sloan, 2013). Further, German propaganda attempted to stir up anti-British sentiment in Ireland. These efforts culminated in the ultimately unsuccessful Easter Rising of 1916. However, German SQU aid succeeded in that it turned a significant portion of previously peaceful British territory into "a theatre for political warfare."[42]

Pre-World War II German Aid to Italy:

Preceding events of the Second World War likewise contain exemplars of SQU aid that were closely tied to the systemic status quo. Germany engaged in a wide pattern of aid delivery that reflected its status as a revisionist power in the years directly preceding 1939. German industrial assistance and military advice rendered to Italy as part of the "Pact of Steel" both directly aided German aims of provoking military conflict in Europe, and, according to some scholars, stimulated revisionist impulses within Italy (Davidson 2002). The totalitarian leadership of both nations employed historical imagery (Painter 2005, Abel 1938) and rhetoric related to lost imperial legacies (and more recent humiliations suffered in the aftermath of the First World War) to justify dissatisfaction with the status quo. In building a coalition to challenge the interwar order, Nazi Germany employed foreign aid as an instrument to encourage revisionism.

[42] As discussed in the section describing status quo maintaining aid, the strategic importance of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War was paramount. Here too we see a role played by British and French SQU aid to foment and support rebellion. Both Britain and France provided significant financial and material support to an Arab nationalist rebellion lead by Sharif Husayn, the ruler of the Hejaz in modern Saudi Arabia. This rebellion famously included the involvement of British intelligence officer TE Lawrence (Rogan 2015).