

Government S-40: International Conflict and Cooperation

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This course is an introduction to the analysis of the causes and character of international conflict and cooperation. Theories of international relations will be presented and then applied to contemporary and historical cases. The course begins with a foundational review of the different levels at which states interact and the primary theoretical paradigms in the field. It then addresses how states achieve cooperation in the face of international anarchy, a question that has attracted the attention of scholars since Thucydides. The course next addresses basic bargaining theory, which uses insights from economics to explore how bargaining breakdowns, commitment problems, and incomplete information can lead to war. Thereafter we examine three popular topics in contemporary international relations research: the roles that psychology, leaders, and domestic politics play in explaining international conflict and cooperation. We also explore the sources and effects of international institutions such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization. We spend a week studying terrorism, a problem of particular significance in the modern world. We will also look at trade, foreign aid, international development, and climate change. We conclude with international law and an exploration of the future of international relations.

Students will watch lecture and other video materials and participate in activities on a weekly basis using the course's Canvas website. There will be weekly (optional) discussion sections run by the teaching fellows using the remote conference platform in Canvas.

Quizzes/Exams:

Game Theory and Strategic Interaction Concepts Quiz: There will be a quiz that will cover ideas from the first part of the course, in particular (but not only!) game theory, strategic interactions, and bargaining. The quiz will have both conceptual questions (such as multiple choice and short answers) and a small amount of very basic math (e.g., knowing that $5 > 1$ and very basic algebra).

To be clear about the weight of different components of the game theory quiz: The vast majority of points of the quiz can be gained from questions on concepts and the basic game theoretic model (e.g., identifying a particular game, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma). A very small amount of points can be gained from being able to solve calculations that relate to the bargaining range (e.g., the one- and two-round bargaining model; if the two-round bargaining appears, it will only be for extra credit). To prepare students for the quiz components that require some math and calculations, a dedicated game theory review session will be held.

You will be able to take the quiz anytime in the 24 hours allowed. This quiz is closed book: you may not use any books, notes, or online sources during this quiz. Once you start the quiz, you will have 120 minutes to submit it. The quiz itself should only take 45 minutes.

We will offer a technical practice quiz on Canvas so you can practice some of the functions needed for the quiz (e.g., typing formulas or uploading pictures of hand-written answers). In addition, we will provide practice questions with answers.

Final: A final exam will occur at the end of the course and will be cumulative. The final exam will be administered online so you will need to have a stable internet connection.

Review sessions will be held before the final examination.

Assignments:

Short Policy Memos

Students must complete three short (750 word) policy memos based on a prompt provided by the Professor. Due dates are listed below. These memos are designed to get you to apply the concepts that you are learning in class to real-world issues. Memos that regurgitate facts about current events and do not apply key concepts from class will do poorly. Memos that creatively apply concepts from class to propose innovative policies will do well. The professor and TFs will not read drafts of memos but will entertain conversation about them.

The first memo will not be graded. This will give you a chance to practice writing and submitting a memo. However, once the first memo is submitted, the teaching staff will release general feedback on the assignment to the class as a whole.

Students seeking graduate credit will write an additional policy memo.

Grading:

Undergraduate Credit

Final grades will be based on the following assignments:

Game Theory and	
Strategic Interaction Concepts Quiz	10%
Policy memos 2 and 3	45%
Final exam	30%
Class participation	15%

Graduate Credit

Final grades will be based on the following assignments:

Game Theory and	
Strategic Interaction Concepts Quiz	10%
Policy memos 2, 3, 4	45%
Final exam	30%
Class participation	15%

Participation:

There will be multiple discussion forums, case studies, and simulations requiring your participation via the Canvas site. We will monitor closely your participation in these activities. You will not be graded for the quality of your participation, but you will be graded on whether or not you participated. This is our way of 'taking attendance.'

There will be designated times each week when the teaching fellows will hold an optional online discussion section for anyone who wishes to participate. They will also be available for questions. These section meetings are not required.

The lesson videos, reading, case studies, and most online discussions are designed so that you can view, read, and participate at a time during the week that is convenient for you. It is our expectation that you complete your participation in these items in the course week in which they are assigned (beginning and ending on Mondays at 9:00 A.M. Eastern U.S. time). Materials are typically made available Friday 9am EST before the beginning of the next week to provide additional time to students over the weekend. We do allow for some additional time to complete a week's tasks in the (hopefully rare) cases in which unforeseen circumstances delay your participation.

Readings:

Students are required to buy the main textbook for the course, listed below. In addition, there will be a set of case studies that students will need to purchase for a small fee. All other non-textbook readings will be available on the course Canvas site.

The syllabus lists a number of recommended readings. Recommended readings may be particularly helpful if you are having difficulty with a concept, are writing a policy memo, or are conducting background research for the larger policy project.

Course Website:

You can access the course website through Canvas course site. The course syllabus, lecture videos, exam announcements, and all course-related links can be found there. All material for each week will be released at 9:00 AM Eastern Time of that week.

Special accommodations:

The Summer School is committed to providing an accessible academic community. The Accessibility Office offers a variety of accommodations and services to students with documented disabilities. Please visit <http://www.summer.harvard.edu/resources-policies/accessibility-services> for more information.

Course Policies and Expectations:

Written assignments are to be double-spaced, size 12 font, with normal margins and must be submitted electronically via the appropriate Canvas assignment submission page. No submitted assignments should be submitted in the form of multiple files. Students are expected to submit assignments on due dates unless they have approval from the relevant University official (Dean, Doctor, etc.) prior to the due date. Late assignments without prior approval will not be accepted unless there is also a demonstration of an emergency situation by a relevant University official. Due dates of approved late submissions will be the day after the emergency ends. *Non-emergency extensions will not be granted.* Submitting an assignment 5 minutes prior to the due date is a bad idea.

Collaboration Prohibited on Policy Memos and Exams:

Students should be aware that in this course collaboration on any work not explicitly labelled group work, and submitted for formal evaluation, is not permitted. This means that you may not discuss your paper assignments with other students. All work should be entirely your own and must use appropriate citation practices to acknowledge the use of books, articles, websites, lectures, discussions, etc., that you have consulted to complete your assignments. Collaboration is highly encouraged in other ways, such as studying for exams and making group notes on the recommended readings.

Communication:

There is a Q&A Discussion Forum on the Canvas site for questions whose answers may be of interest to other students. The TFs and Professor Tingley will endeavor to answer emails within 24 hours during weekdays. Email can be less efficient than real-time conversations. If your question requires a lengthy response please arrange for a real-time conversation.

Publishing or Distributing Course Materials

Students may not post, publish, sell, or otherwise publicly distribute course materials without the written permission of the course instructor. Such materials include, but are not limited to, the following: lecture notes, lecture slides, video, or audio recordings, assignments, problem sets, examinations, other students' work, and answer keys. Students who sell, post, publish, or distribute course materials without written permission, whether for the purposes of soliciting answers or otherwise, may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including requirement to withdraw from the Summer School. Further, students may not make video or audio recordings of class sessions for their own use without written permission of the instructor.

Office Hours and Contact Info for Instructors:

Professor Tingley's office hours are by appointment. Email him to setup a time.

Sections, Office Hours, and Contact Info for Teaching Fellows:

The teaching fellows for the course is Stefan Tschauko (stschauko@g.harvard.edu). He will run optional weekly review sessions. Section times (EST):

- Thursday, 11am
 - Thursday, 5pm
- (one exception: on July 28, the 5pm section will meet at 7pm)

Summary of Key Dates:

<i>Week 1 begins:</i>	June 20
<i>Section Lists Posted:</i>	June 27 on Canvas
<i>First Section Meeting:</i>	Week of June 27
<i>Game theory quiz:</i>	July 5. Any two-hour period within a 24-hour window from July 5, 9AM, to July 6, 9AM.
<i>Final Exam:</i>	August 2 (opens at 6:30PM EST) to August 3 (Closes at 6:30PM EST). Delivered online.

Note course website for policy memo timelines.

Required Textbook:

Jeffrey Frieden, David Lake and Kenneth Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions*. Norton, 5th Edition (note: you will need the 5th edition). *Referred to as FLS in the reading assignments below.*

Each lesson has a “Spotlight” that we have written. It is provided at the end of the video content for each lesson.

Course Learning Objectives

- Describe basic theoretical traditions in international relations, their core differences, and how they explain the behavior of states and other actors.
- Demonstrate a basic understanding of strategic interaction, how “game theory” represents strategic interaction, and how to solve games using the Nash equilibrium.
- Distinguish between explanations of war that are based on commitment problems and those based on incomplete information.
- Distinguish between private goods, public goods, club goods, and common pool resources. Identify when free rider problems be most severe.
- Analyze international negotiations from the perspective of a two-level game. Will democracies or autocracies will have an advantage at the bargaining table.
- Diagnose a political system in terms of the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate size. Connect this to how we should expect leaders from different political systems to invest in private versus public goods.
- Contrast comparative advantage and absolute advantage.
- Connect the idea of excludable benefits to protectionist trade policy.
- Diagnose development failures as a function of poverty traps and developed country policies.
- Evaluate whether international law is effective or epiphenomenal.
- Contrast the politics of immigration to that of international trade.
- Distinguish between public goods and common pool resources.

Summary of assignment dates

June 21: Policy memo 1 prompt announced

June 28: Policy memo 1 due on Canvas

July 5–6: Game Theory and Strategic Interaction Concepts Quiz quiz

July 5: Graduate policy memo assigned

July 12: Policy memo 2 prompt announced

July 19: Policy memo 2 due on Canvas

July 26: Policy memo 3 prompt announced

July 30: Graduate policy memo due

August 2 to August 3: Final exam available

August 4: Policy memo 3 due on Canvas

Week 1 (6/20-6/25):

Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Evidence; Interests and Interactions

Lesson 1: Introduction and Overview

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Describe how concerns over “sovereignty” have shaped international relations.
- 2) Contrast liberal and realist views of international relations.
 - Stephen Walt (1998). “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” *Foreign Policy* (Spring): 29-46.
 - FLS Chapter 1
 - Theories of IR Spotlight: End of the Cold War

Lesson 2: Images and Dilemmas in International Relations

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Describe how each of Waltz’s images explains contemporary international events
- 2) Identify the sources of the “security dilemma” and how states can get out of the dilemma.
 - Kenneth Waltz (1959). *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Ch. 1, 6, 8.
 - Level of Analysis Spotlight: World War II

Recommended

- Joseph Nye (1993). “Counterfactuals.” In *Understanding International Conflicts* (1st ed.), 42-45.
- Alexander Wendt (1992). “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization*, 46(2): 391-425.

Lesson 3: Actors, Interests and Strategic Interaction

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Diagnose any international current event in terms of the relevant actors, interests, interactions, and institutions.
- 2) What is the Pareto frontier, and what do states do if they find themselves on it?
 - FLS Chapter 2.
 - Strategic Theories of IR Spotlight: Iran Nuclear Deal

Recommended

- Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff (1991). *Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life*. Ch. 5-6.

Lesson 4: Strategic Interaction in International Relations and Cooperation in the Face of Anarchy

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) What is the difference between a Nash Equilibrium and an outcome that Pareto dominates another outcome?
- 2) How do international institutions reduce the possibility of mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma?
 - Thucydides (1998). *The Peloponnesian War* (Walter Blanco, trans.) "Introduction" and "Melian Dialogue."
 - Robert Jervis (1978). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30(2): 167-214.
 - Cooperation in the Face of Anarchy Spotlight: Bretton Woods System

Recommended

- Robert Axelrod (1981). "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." *American Political Science Review* 75(2): 306-318.

****Note:** Policy memo 1 prompt announced June 21.

Week 2 (6/26 – 7/2): **Bargaining and War**

Lesson 1: Bargaining and International Relations

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) What generates commitment problems?
- 2) Solve mathematically for the peaceful bargaining range in a two-period game with a specified amount of shifting power (p_1 p_2).
 - FLS, Ch. 3.
 - Fearon, James D.. "Rationalist Explanations for War". *International Organization* 49.3 (1995): 379–414.
 - Commitment Problems and War Spotlight: Six-Day War

Recommended

- Thomas Schelling (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Ch. 2-3.
- Thomas Schelling (1966). *Arms and Influence*. Ch. 1-2.
- Henry Kissinger (2012). "The Future of US-Chinese Relations: Conflict is a Choice, not a Necessity." *Foreign Affairs* 91: 44-55.
- James Fearon, "Try Bargaining before Fighting," <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/09/try-bargaining-before-fighting/>

Lesson 2: Incomplete Information and War

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Identify the conditions under which a country should believe the information it is told by another country.
 - 2) Identify how countries engage with “costly signaling” and why this is important for information to be transmitted between opponents.
- Fearon, James D.. “Rationalist Explanations for War”. *International Organization* 49.3 (1995): 379–414.
 - Incomplete Information Spotlight: The Russo-Japanese War

Recommended

- Abhinay Muthoo (2000). “A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory.” *World Economics* 1(2): 145-166.
- Jessica Weeks (2008). “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” *International Organization* 62(1) 35-64.
- Dan Reiter (2003). “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27-43.
- Dan Reiter (1995). “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen.” *International Security* 20(2). Read pp. 5-16, 25-34.
- Linda J. Bilmes (2008). “Iraq’s 100-Year Mortgage.” *Foreign Policy* (March/April): 84-85.

**Note: Policy memo 1 due June 28.

Optional video: Game Theory Example Calculations

*Game theory review session **

Technical practice "quiz"

Substantive game theory practice quiz

Week 3 (7/3 – 7/9):

Psychology, Leaders, and Interest Groups

Domestic Politics and International Relations

Lesson 1: Psychology and International Relations

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) How do first-image scholars counter Waltz’s criticism?
 - 2) Articulate the relationship between overconfidence and hawkishness, and argue if this relationship actually exists or not.
- Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon (2007). “Why Hawks Win.” *Foreign Policy* 158: 34-38.
 - Rose McDermott (2007). *Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making*. Ch. 1-2.
 - Psychological Perspectives in IR Spotlight: Sino-Indian War

Recommended

- Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack (2001). "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25(4): 107-146.
- Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard J. Zeckhauser (2012). "Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence." *Intelligence and National Security* 27(5).
- Rose McDermott, Dustin Tingley, Jonathan Cowden, Giovanni Frazzetto, and Dominic Johnson (2009). "Monoamine Oxidase A Gene (MAOA) Predicts Behavioral Aggression Following Provocation." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106(7): 2118-2123.
- Thomas Hobbes (1651). "On the Natural Condition of Mankind." *Leviathan*. Part I, Chapter XIII. <https://www.iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/#H5>

Lesson 2: Leaders and Interest Groups

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Why do interest groups have an advantage over the general public in influencing policy?
- 2) What types of groups are mostly likely to play an active role in foreign policy?

- John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006). "The Israel Lobby." *London Review of Books* 28(6): 3-12.
- Interest Groups Spotlight: East India Company

Recommended

- Jeff Frieden, 1988, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy: 1914-1940," *International Organization* 42(1): 59-90.

Lesson 3: Selectorate Theory

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Identify what determines the loyalty norm and *why* this leads to changes in public good spending.
- 2) Why is the loyalty norm determined by a government's election institutions?

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith (2011). *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. Ch. 1-2.
- "The Rules for Rulers" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rStL7niR7gs>
- Selectorate Theory Spotlight: Idi Amin

Recommended

- Peter Gourevitch (1978). "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32(4): 881-911.
- Steven R. David (1991). "Explaining Third World Alignment" *World Politics* 43(2): 233-256.
- Paul Kennedy (1989). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. "Introduction" and "Epilogue."

****Note 1: Game Theory and Strategic Interaction Concepts Quiz July 5–6.**

You can take this quiz anytime within the 24-hour window between 9:00 AM on July 5 and 9:00 AM on July 6. Once you start the quiz, you will have only two hours to complete it.

****Note 2:** Grad policy memo assigned July 5.

****Note 3:** Optional viewing of “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,” (Peter Sellers, directed by Stanley Kubrick, 1964, 94 min.). View the film on your own or with friends and family! Lego versions of Dr. Strangelove are [here](#) and [here](#).

Week 4 (7/10 – 7/16):

Negotiation and Two Level Games;

International Organizations

Lesson 1: Negotiation and Two Level Games

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Explain why democratic leaders may have a bargaining advantage internationally compared to autocratic leaders.
- 2) Characterize the two levels involved in a current international negotiation
 - Robert Putnam (1988). “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
 - John Odell and Dustin Tingley, “Negotiating Agreements in International Relations”, chapter 7
 - Negotiation and Two-Level Games Spotlight: The Greek Debt Crisis

Case Study:

The Iranian Hostage Negotiations: November 1979-January 1981, Georgetown ISD Case 134

<https://isd-georgetown-university.myshopify.com/products/the-iranian-hostage-negotiations-november-1979-january-1981>

Lesson 2: International Organizations

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Understand when countries benefit from and are harmed by international institutions.
- 2) How does iteration and issue linkage help facilitate cooperation, and how do international institutions facilitate iteration and issue linkage?
 - FLS, Ch. 5.
 - John Mearsheimer (1994-5). “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
 - International Institutions Spotlight: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Case Study

A Question of Sovereignty: Bahrain, Qatar, and the International Court of Justice, Georgetown ISD Case 301

Recommended

- Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. 2012. "International Organizations and Institutions." *Handbook of International Relations*.

Review session: Content review

****Note:** Policy Memo 2 assigned July 12.

Week 5 (7/17 – 7/23):

Terrorism;

Trade;

Development and Environment

Lesson 1: Terrorism and Counterinsurgency

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Consider government responses to terrorism. When are governments successful and when are terrorist groups successful?
- 2) Define terrorism and explain the "logic" of terrorism.

- FLS, Ch. 6.
- Terrorism Spotlight: Basque, Palestine, and IRA

Recommended

- Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006). "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.
- Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, and Richard Davis (2007). "Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution." *Science* 317 (August 24): 1039-40.
- Richard K. Betts (1998). "The New Threat of Mass Destruction." *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb): 26-40.
- SD Biddle, JA Friedman, and JN Shapiro (2012). "Testing the Surge: Why Violence Declined in Iraq in 2007." *International Security* 37(1) :1-34.
- Robert Pape (2003). "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343–61.
- Scott Ashworth, Joshua Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay (2008). "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 102(2): 269-273.
- Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob Shapiro (2010). "Constructive COIN: How Development Can Fight Radicals." *Foreign Affairs* 1 (June). Link: https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jns/files/constructive_coin_foreign_affairs.pdf

Lesson 2: Why trade? Why protect?

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Isolate the difference between comparative and absolute advantage.
 - 2) Explain why interest groups are more likely to favor protectionist policy.
- FLS, Ch. 7.
 - Dani Rodrik (2001). "Trading in Illusions." *Foreign Policy* (March/April): 55-62.
 - Trade Spotlight: Voluntary Export Restraint

Lesson 3: Development

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Explain the relationship between poverty traps and development failures.
 - 2) What role do institutions, including those discussed in our unit on selectorate theory, play in determining development outcomes?
- FLS, Ch. 10.
 - Resource Curse Spotlight: Nigerian Oil

Recommended

- Paul Krugman (1997). "In Praise of Cheap Labor: Bad Jobs at Bad Wages are Better Than No Jobs at All." *Slate* (March 20).
- Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn (2000). "Two Cheers for Sweatshops." *New York Times* (September 24). <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/24/magazine/two-cheers-for-sweatshops.html>
- Jeffrey D. Sachs (2005). "The Development Challenge." *Foreign Affairs* 84 (March/April): 78-90.
- William Easterly (2005). "The Utopian Nightmare." *Foreign Policy* (September/October): 58-64.
- Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik, and Arvind Subramanian (2005). "How to Help Poor Countries." *Foreign Affairs* 84(4): 136-152.

Lesson 4: International Environmental Politics

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Contrast public good and common pool resource problems.
 - 2) What challenges do international institutions face in solving the problem of global climate change?
- FLS, Ch. 13.
 - Bill McKibben (2012). "Global Warming's Terrifying New Math." *Rolling Stone* (July 22).
 - International Environmental Politics Spotlight: Asian Water Politics

Recommended

- Garrett Hardin (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Science* 162(3859): 1243-48.
- Dustin Tingley and Michael Tomz, "Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change," forthcoming, *Comparative Political Studies*, <http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/tingleymtomzclimatefinal.pdf>
- Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vahtoranta (1994). "The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy." *International Organization* 48(1): 77-105.
- Warren Richey (2011). "Who Can Force Utilities to Cut Greenhouse Gases? Supreme Court to Decide." *Christian Science Monitor*, April 19.
- Lawrence H. Summers (1991). "Let them Eat Pollution." Internal Memo, Post-Script. *The Economist* (12 December): 1. <http://find.galegroup.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/econ/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECON&userGroupName=camb55135&tabID=T003&docPage=article&docId=GP4100234209&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>

Review session: Content review

**Note: Policy memo 2 due July 19.

Week 6 (7/24 – 7/30):

Foreign Aid;

Immigration and Refugees

Lesson 1: Foreign Aid

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) Why do countries give foreign aid?
- 2) What challenges does foreign aid face in leading to development?
 - Helen Millner and Dustin Tingley (2013). "Introduction to the Geopolitics of Foreign Aid." Elgar. [Here](#).
 - Foreign Aid Spotlight: BRICS Development Bank

Recommended

- Helen Millner and Dustin Tingley (2011). "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy." *International Organization* (65): 37–68.
- Carole Lancaster (2008). "Danish and US Foreign Aid Compared: A View from Washington." *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook*, 31-54.
- Richard Nielsen, Michael Findley, Zach Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel Nielsen (2011). "Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2): 219-232.

Case Study:

Negotiating Development Assistance: USAID and the Choice between Public and Private Implementation in Haiti. Georgetown ISD Case 117

Lesson 2: Immigration and Refugees

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) How has international migration changed over time, and what future changes are likely?
- 2) How are the politics of immigration similar or dissimilar to international trade?

Readings:

- Michael Clemens (2013) "More Unskilled Workers, Please." *Foreign Policy* (July 8).
- Bob Davis (2016). "Immigrants Push Down Wages for Low-Income Workers—But How Much?" *The Wall Street Journal* (Feb. 9.)
- Immigration and Refugees Spotlight: Rohingya Muslims

Review session: Content review

**Note 1: Policy memo 3 assigned July 26.

**Note 2: Graduate Memo due July 30.

Week 7 (7/31-8/4):

International Law and the Future of International Relations

Lesson 1: International law and the Future of International Relations

Learning Objectives and Key Questions:

- 1) How has international law changed over time?
- 2) Does international law have an impact on state behavior? Why or why not?

- FLS, Ch. 11.
- International Law Spotlight: Unmanned and Autonomous Weapons

Recommended

- Samantha Power (2001). "Bystanders to Genocide." *Atlantic Monthly* (September): 84-108.
- Hans Morgenthau (1985). "The Main Problems of International Law." In *Politics Among Nations*, 6th rev. ed., 293-327.
- Beth Simmons (2008). "International Law and International Relations." *Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics*.
- James D. Morrow (2007). "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 559-572.
- Eric Posner (2009). "Think Again: International Law." *Foreign Policy* (September 17).

Review session for final exam

****Note 1:** Final exam August 2, 6:30PM to August 3, 6:30PM.

****Note 2:** Policy memo 3 due August 4.

The exam will be conducted online through Canvas using an online proctoring system. You will have 3 hours to complete the exam.