

Public Finance and Immigration Preferences: A Lost Connection?: Online Appendix

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Abstract

This online appendix reports additional results from the article “Public Finance and Immigration Preferences: A Lost Connection?”

1 Online Appendix

1.1 Income Quartile Analysis

HSS also specified models using income quartiles instead of educational attainment to measure factor endowments. I constructed a quartile measure using a 14-level income question on the CCES survey and re-estimated models, with fixed effects, for each of the three questions. The income/state finance variable (Fiscal1) are denoted as F1IncQ1, F1IncQ2, F1IncQ3, F1IncQ4 for the first, second, third and fourth quartiles. For each question I also estimate a model with and without the additional control variables.

In general, the results presented in Table 1 are similar to those discussed previously. The only difference is that the interactions with the third and fourth income quartiles (i.e., individuals with an income between the 50th and 75th percentile, and those above the 75th percentile) were positive and significant for the ImmAmnesty question when the additional control variables were included. This supports the HSS argument: Those at the upper levels of the income distribution in states with high immigration and public finance spending were more likely to oppose the granting of amnesty to illegal immigrants. This result, however, was not found with the ImmEnforce question or when the additional control variables were not included. For the CAFTA.Support variable I present results only using the Fiscal3 variable to capture information about the state fiscal environment. Those in the third income quartile (between the 50th and 75th percentile) in a state with high welfare spending were more likely to oppose CAFTA-DR, which is some evidence of a post-tax type of effect. However, as before, this does not extend to the Fiscal4 measure.

1.2 Trade Preferences

The trade question (CAFTA) asked: “This year Congress also debated a new free trade agreement that reduces barriers to trade between the U.S. and countries in Central America. Some politicians argue that the agreement allows America to better compete in the global economy and would create more stable democracies in Central America. Other politicians argue that it helps businesses to move jobs abroad where labor is cheaper and does not protect American producers. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against the trade agreement?” This again differs from the

CCES 2006: Immigration and Trade Preferences across Income Quartiles.

	ImmEnforce		ImmAmnesty		CAFTA-F3	
IncQ2	0.05 [0.04]	-0.02 [0.05]	0.03 [0.02]	-0.01 [0.03]	0.06+ [0.03]	0.06+ [0.03]
IncQ3	0.15** [0.05]	-0.01 [0.05]	0.07* [0.03]	-0.00 [0.03]	-0.10* [0.05]	-0.09+ [0.05]
IncQ4	-0.11* [0.04]	-0.28** [0.05]	-0.14** [0.03]	-0.22** [0.02]	-0.35** [0.03]	-0.33** [0.04]
Hispanic	-0.82** [0.04]	-0.74** [0.05]	-0.73** [0.04]	-0.71** [0.04]	-0.35** [0.04]	-0.38** [0.04]
AgeSquared	-0.00** [0.00]	-0.00** [0.00]	-0.00** [0.00]	-0.00** [0.00]	-0.00** [0.00]	-0.00** [0.00]
Age	0.06** [0.00]	0.04** [0.01]	0.05** [0.00]	0.03** [0.00]	0.05** [0.00]	0.05** [0.00]
Gender	0.15** [0.03]	0.01 [0.03]	0.07** [0.02]	-0.04+ [0.02]	-0.24** [0.03]	-0.25** [0.03]
Unemploy%	-2.54 [1.55]	-1.16 [0.87]	-2.38+ [1.26]	-1.27 [0.85]	0.99+ [0.58]	0.23 [0.75]
F1IncQ1	-0.11** [0.02]	0.02 [0.11]	0.01 [0.07]	0.05 [0.09]		
F1IncQ2	-0.11+ [0.05]	0.01 [0.09]	-0.04 [0.05]	0.02 [0.07]		
F1IncQ3	-0.09 [0.13]	0.08 [0.12]	0.06 [0.06]	0.13* [0.05]		
F1IncQ4	-0.06 [0.12]	0.09 [0.14]	0.07 [0.06]	0.13* [0.07]		
PartyID		0.10** [0.01]		0.09** [0.01]		-0.06** [0.01]
Ideology		0.02** [0.00]		0.02** [0.00]		-0.00** [0.00]
UnionMember		0.12** [0.04]		0.14** [0.03]		0.22** [0.02]
GovtWorker		0.10 [0.08]		0.07 [0.05]		0.02 [0.07]
Unemployed		0.15* [0.08]		0.13** [0.05]		0.03 [0.06]
F3IncQ1					0.10* [0.04]	0.08 [0.05]
F3IncQ2					0.03 [0.06]	0.07 [0.06]
F3IncQ3					0.15* [0.06]	0.18** [0.07]
F3IncQ4					0.08 [0.07]	0.10 [0.08]
Constant	-0.82** [0.15]	-1.78** [0.13]	-0.73** [0.14]	-1.64** [0.14]	-0.93** [0.11]	-0.56** [0.13]
Observations	13039	12306	28534	26011	24357	22407

Table 1: Immigration and trade preferences across income quartiles. State FE's included but not reported. Standard errors in brackets, + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

ANES question used by HSS in that the question refers much more directly to a particular trade agreement instead of being about trade in general.¹

Table 2 focuses on trade preferences. HSS suspect that state fiscal environments will not condition the influence of skill on trade policy preferences. The dependent variable CAFTA_Support is coded as a 1 if the respondent opposed the CAFTA-DR treaty and 0 otherwise. Consistent with previous findings those with higher levels of education were less likely to oppose CAFTA. Following HSS the education terms were interacted with the Fiscal3 (welfare per capita) and Fiscal4 (welfare/state GDP) variables constructed from 2005/2006 data.² Here, too, I focus on the terms relating fiscal exposure and individual education level. In each model these variables are all negative. Without state fixed effects or additional controls the interaction with the NoHSEdu_F3 variable is the only education/state fiscal variable that is significant. With state fixed-effects all of the interactions are significant. However, the substantive effects of the interaction terms differ and are presented in Table 3. Moving from a low to high welfare spending state, the estimated change for those with no high school education ranges from a 20 percent to 35 percent decline in probability of opposing CAFTA. The other educational interactions range between declines of 9 percent and 25 percent.

This suggests that individuals with low levels of education who live in states with highly redistributive regimes (on a per capita basis) are more likely to favor trade liberalization than individuals with similar educational backgrounds in states with little redistribution. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Hays *et al.* (2005), namely, that redistribution can soften the blows of globalization to those who might lose and that these policies can influence their support for trade liberalization. But we also see a similar (though smaller) effect for the highly educated, which provides additional evidence for HSS's null findings regarding the hypothesis that highly skilled individuals in states

¹ANES trade question: "Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you support or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought about this?"

²The educational attainment terms with a dummy variable equal to one if the state level measure of welfare spending per native was greater than the national median (labeled with "F3" for the HSS "Fiscal 3 measure") or a similar measure but where welfare spending is measured as a percentage of state GDP (labeled as F4).

with high redistribution should oppose trade liberalization. The people who would pay the most for this redistribution (the highly educated) do not necessarily oppose trade liberalization any more when they live in states with high levels of redistribution. Finally, models estimated with the Fiscal 4 measure do not show much significant evidence for the compensation hypothesis suggested by Hays *et al.* (2005).

CCES 2006: CAFTA Opposition

	Fiscal3 Models				Fiscal4 Models			
College4yr	-0.59**	-0.58**	-0.60**	-0.58**	-0.45**	-0.44**	-0.50**	-0.49**
	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.10]
SomeCollege	-0.23**	-0.22*	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.10	-0.09	-0.13	-0.13
	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.09]
HSGrad	-0.13	-0.13	-0.08	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.12]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]
College4yr_F3	-0.03	-0.53**	-0.05	-0.67**				
	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.03]				
SomeCollege_F3	-0.04	-0.55**	-0.07+	-0.70**				
	[0.05]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.03]				
HSGrad_F3	-0.05	-0.54**	-0.04	-0.65**				
	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]				
NoHSEdu_F3	-0.29*	-0.79**	-0.25*	-0.87**				
	[0.11]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.13]				
College4yr_F4					0.04	-0.27**	0.02	0.02
					[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]
SomeCollege_F4					0.05	-0.26**	0.03	0.02
					[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]
HSGrad_F4					0.08	-0.23**	0.03	0.01
					[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.03]
NoHSEdu_F4					0.03	-0.28*	-0.01	-0.02
					[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.14]
Hispanic	-0.28**	-0.26**	-0.29**	-0.28**	-0.27**	-0.26**	-0.29**	-0.28**
	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]
AgeSquared	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Age	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Gender	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**	-0.26**
	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Unemploy%	2.60**	1.95**	1.76**	1.07+	2.56**	1.97**	1.66**	1.06+
	[0.48]	[0.42]	[0.62]	[0.57]	[0.51]	[0.44]	[0.61]	[0.58]
PartyID			-0.07**	-0.07**			-0.07**	-0.07**
			[0.01]	[0.01]			[0.01]	[0.01]
Ideology			-0.00**	-0.00**			-0.00**	-0.00**
			[0.00]	[0.00]			[0.00]	[0.00]
UnionMember			0.20**	0.21**			0.20**	0.21**
			[0.03]	[0.03]			[0.03]	[0.03]
GovtWorker			0.01	0.03			0.02	0.03
			[0.07]	[0.08]			[0.07]	[0.08]
Unemployed			0.06	0.05			0.06	0.05
			[0.06]	[0.06]			[0.06]	[0.06]
Constant	-0.44**	-0.08	-0.08	0.46**	-0.60**	-0.50**	-0.20+	-0.32**
	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.11]
Observations	28045	28045	25705	25705	28045	28045	25705	25705
	No FE		FE		No FE		FE	

Table 2: Opposition to CAFTA as a function of individual demographics and state fiscal environment. CCES 2006 survey. Standard errors in brackets, $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

variable	CAFTA	
	Base Model	With Controls
College4yr_F3	-.087(.011)	-.258(.011)
SomeCollege_F3	-.094(.008)	-.266(.012)
HSGrad_F3	-.093(.016)	-.253(.019)
NoHSEdu_F3	-.203(.049)	-.347(.05)

Table 3: Change in predicted probability of opposing CAFTA moving individuals in each educational category from living in a state with low fiscal exposure to immigration to high fiscal exposure using the fixed effects models.

1.3 Order Effects in Survey Experiment

One potential problem with the preceding country level analyses is that the survey experiment asked the ImmGood question, which included the experimental manipulation of skill level, prior to asking for preferences about flows from separate countries. It is possible that this sequencing might have primed respondents to think specifically about low (or high) skilled immigrants, which could have affected their responses to the immigration flow questions for particular countries. This might produce more muted results, for example, if people in the low and high skill treatments thought about flows from a particular country in opposite directions. To deal with this possibility I split the sample by the skill treatment assignment.

Tables 4 and 5 present ordered probit models using the baseline set of covariates and broken out by whether someone previously received the low or high skill treatment. For each country/skill combination two models are estimated, one without state fixed effects and one with state fixed effects. All models continue to cluster standard errors at the state level. The results are interesting but still do not clearly support the HSS hypothesis. For all geographic sources of immigrants and using only those in the low skill treatment, the interaction term between college education and the Fiscal1 variable is positive and significant in the fixed effect models. However, the coefficients on the interactions with lower educational variables are also positive, significant, and generally larger in magnitude in these models (though these differences in magnitudes may not map onto substantive differences given the non-linearity of the link function).

Models without state fixed effects for Mexico, China, and India generally estimated

a relationship for respondents in the low skill treatment that was opposite what would be predicted by the public finance theory. Here the coefficient on the interaction between college education and the Fiscal1 variable was negative and significant for Mexico and India. To get a sense if these interactions were substantively meaningful Figures 1 and 2 present simulations as before but estimated separately for those who had received the low and high skill treatments.³ When respondents had previously received the low skill treatment and were asked about Mexican immigration, the effect of moving someone with a college education from a state with low fiscal exposure to a state with high fiscal exposure *decreased* opposition to immigration flows from Mexico. A similar pattern obtains for immigration flows from India and China. In other words, even if some sort of priming is occurring through the randomized skill treatment, it operates in a way that does not lend support to the argument that high skilled individuals will be more opposed to immigration when they live in a state with redistributive public finance policy and high levels of immigration.

³As before the CLARIFY procedure was unable to process some of the fixed effects models and so these figures present the non-FE models.

	Mexico				Europe			
	High Skill		Low Skill		High Skill		Low Skill	
College	-0.80*	-0.68+	-0.13	-0.13	-1.37**	-1.39**	-0.36	-0.44
	[0.34]	[0.39]	[0.26]	[0.28]	[0.35]	[0.39]	[0.27]	[0.28]
SomeCollege	-0.50	-0.40	0.11	0.14	-0.85*	-0.83*	-0.08	-0.09
	[0.36]	[0.41]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.35]	[0.40]	[0.25]	[0.24]
HSGrad	-0.30	-0.19	0.29	0.27	-0.63+	-0.59	0.15	0.07
	[0.33]	[0.38]	[0.24]	[0.25]	[0.33]	[0.38]	[0.26]	[0.26]
AgeSquared	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00*	-0.00+	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Age	0.05**	0.06**	0.03**	0.03*	0.07**	0.07**	0.08**	0.07**
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Gender	-0.26**	-0.25**	-0.11*	-0.12*	-0.27**	-0.23*	-0.31**	-0.30**
	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.07]	[0.07]
PartyID	0.08**	0.08**	0.06**	0.06**	0.03	0.02	0.04*	0.04*
	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Ideology	0.07	0.07	0.12**	0.14**	0.07	0.06	0.08*	0.08*
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Hispanic	-0.45**	-0.42**	-0.69**	-0.67**	0.15	0.23	-0.12	-0.06
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.14]	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.16]	[0.09]	[0.07]
Unemployed	-0.15	-0.21	0.16	0.21	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.12
	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.15]	[0.15]
College4yr_F1	-0.01	0.38**	-0.31*	0.55**	0.13	0.34**	-0.06	0.67**
	[0.17]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.11]	[0.13]	[0.16]	[0.19]
SomeCollege_F1	-0.17+	0.24	0.08	0.94**	0.01	0.17	-0.02	0.63**
	[0.09]	[0.18]	[0.09]	[0.12]	[0.10]	[0.17]	[0.12]	[0.13]
HSGrad_F1	0.14	0.52*	-0.13	0.75**	-0.03	0.14	-0.18	0.54**
	[0.12]	[0.23]	[0.12]	[0.18]	[0.14]	[0.19]	[0.13]	[0.18]
NoHSEdu_F1	-0.33	0.15	0.42	1.25**	-1.12*	-0.93+	0.59	1.13**
	[0.46]	[0.55]	[0.28]	[0.31]	[0.48]	[0.55]	[0.39]	[0.40]
cut1								
Constant	-0.61	-0.11	-0.21	1.16**	-0.46	-0.09	0.35	1.50**
	[0.39]	[0.43]	[0.40]	[0.42]	[0.53]	[0.56]	[0.52]	[0.52]
cut2								
Constant	-0.16	0.35	0.33	1.71**	0.12	0.51	1.06*	2.24**
	[0.39]	[0.43]	[0.41]	[0.43]	[0.53]	[0.56]	[0.52]	[0.52]
cut3								
Constant	0.70+	1.23**	1.20**	2.62**	1.34**	1.76**	2.28**	3.49**
	[0.38]	[0.42]	[0.39]	[0.41]	[0.52]	[0.55]	[0.52]	[0.52]
cut4								
Constant	1.96**	2.54**	2.38**	3.84**	2.37**	2.81**	3.25**	4.49**
	[0.38]	[0.42]	[0.40]	[0.42]	[0.52]	[0.56]	[0.52]	[0.52]
Observations	1045	1045	1106	1106	1033	1033	1088	1088
	No FE	FE	No FE	FE	No FE	FE	No FE	FE

Table 4: Preferences over Mexican and European flows by whether respondents previously received question about high or low skill immigration. Standard errors in brackets, $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$




Figure 1: Preferences over immigration flows by country including only respondents assigned to low skill level treatment. Estimates report simulated changes in probabilities for belonging to each of the 5 levels of the ordinal dependent variable.

1.4 Reanalysis of HSS data

HSS argue that the change in fiscal exposure to immigration of some states from 1992 to 2000 helps them identify their empirical results. Two sets of evidence suggest that this is less likely to be the case. First, using their data and estimating models without the year fixed effect generates nearly identical results as models with the year fixed effect. Table 6 replicates their model 1 and 2. The next two models exclude the time fixed effect. The results barely change. Estimating their results separately by year, however, indicates no significant interaction between fiscal environment (their *Fiscal1* variable) and college education. Second, very few states actually change their *Fiscal1* status from 1992 to 2000. Specifically, in 1992 the following states are classified by HSS as having the high coding for the *Fiscal1* variable: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. In 2000 this set of states is California, Connecticut, DC, Illinois, Maryland,

	China				India			
	High Skill		Low Skill		High Skill		Low Skill	
College	-0.96**	-0.90**	-0.01	-0.02	-1.04**	-1.03**	-0.17	-0.22
	[0.30]	[0.35]	[0.25]	[0.26]	[0.29]	[0.33]	[0.25]	[0.26]
SomeCollege	-0.49+	-0.43	0.21	0.20	-0.59*	-0.57+	0.13	0.11
	[0.28]	[0.33]	[0.24]	[0.24]	[0.30]	[0.34]	[0.24]	[0.24]
HSGrad	-0.24	-0.13	0.41	0.36	-0.31	-0.28	0.25	0.14
	[0.27]	[0.31]	[0.26]	[0.26]	[0.25]	[0.30]	[0.26]	[0.26]
AgeSquared	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00*	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Age	0.07**	0.08**	0.05**	0.04**	0.08**	0.08**	0.06**	0.05**
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Gender	-0.26**	-0.25**	-0.21**	-0.21**	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.24**	-0.25**
	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.07]
PartyID	0.05*	0.04+	0.03+	0.03	0.06**	0.06*	0.03	0.03
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Ideology	0.04	0.04	0.06+	0.07*	0.03	0.03	0.07*	0.08*
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Hispanic	-0.08	-0.05	-0.19	-0.16	-0.05	-0.01	-0.20*	-0.16
	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.10]	[0.10]
Unemployed	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.12	-0.00	-0.02	0.18	0.18
	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.15]	[0.15]
College4yr_F1	0.02	0.32*	-0.19	0.93**	0.00	0.44**	-0.34+	0.85**
	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.18]	[0.15]
SomeCollege_F1	-0.03	0.28**	0.01	1.17**	-0.07	0.38**	-0.09	1.10**
	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.15]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.12]
HSGrad_F1	-0.08	0.17	-0.23*	0.93**	-0.17	0.24	-0.21*	1.04**
	[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.11]	[0.17]	[0.11]	[0.17]	[0.11]	[0.15]
NoHSEdu_F1	-0.68+	-0.34	0.72**	1.79**	-0.92*	-0.49	0.60+	1.75**
	[0.38]	[0.45]	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.36]	[0.43]	[0.36]	[0.33]
cut1								
Constant	-0.25	0.35	0.02	1.33*	-0.30	0.06	-0.09	1.33*
	[0.35]	[0.37]	[0.51]	[0.53]	[0.41]	[0.46]	[0.53]	[0.54]
cut2								
Constant	0.42	1.05**	0.59	1.92**	0.30	0.68	0.60	2.05**
	[0.36]	[0.38]	[0.51]	[0.53]	[0.43]	[0.47]	[0.54]	[0.55]
cut3								
Constant	1.46**	2.12**	1.69**	3.06**	1.41**	1.83**	1.69**	3.18**
	[0.34]	[0.37]	[0.50]	[0.51]	[0.41]	[0.46]	[0.52]	[0.53]
cut4								
Constant	2.66**	3.36**	2.66**	4.06**	2.59**	3.03**	2.70**	4.22**
	[0.33]	[0.37]	[0.51]	[0.52]	[0.42]	[0.47]	[0.53]	[0.54]
Observations	1032	1032	1088	1088	1036	1036	1091	1091
	No FE	FE	No FE	FE	No FE	FE	No FE	FE

Table 5: Preferences over Indian and Chinese flows by whether respondents previously received question about high or low skill immigration. Standard errors in brackets, $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$




Figure 2: Preferences over immigration flows by country including only respondents assigned to low skill level treatment. Estimates report simulated changes in probabilities for belonging to each of the 5 levels of the ordinal dependent variable.

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Washington. Hence the set of states that change from Fiscal1=0 to Fiscal1=1 is DC, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. DC and NM have sample sizes of 4 and 3 respectively, and all are in 2000. And no states shift in the other direction over time.

A reasonable question to ask, then, is whether the set of states that changed their fiscal status from 0 to 1 show the empirical pattern they find when estimated on the entire sample. If the over time change in Fiscal1 status is driving the strong interactive effect of CollegeXFiscal1 in the original models, then it is reasonable to expect that we would find a positive and significant coefficient on the CollegeXFiscal1 variable. Table 7 estimates models only including these states that changed, with the interaction terms obviously dropped. While the coefficients on the college variable are positive it is never significant. Instead, the coefficients on the high school and some college variables are positive and highly significant. These results are at odds with the results published by HSS. Additional simple tests (like differences in proportions) also show little changes in the attitudes of college educated persons in these states. I do note, however, that the year dummy in these models with this sample is now sizeable and very significant, suggesting that on average opposition to immigration went up in these states.

	Original Specification		New Specifications					
	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	6
HighSchool	0.18+	0.17	0.18+	0.17	0.26*	0.26*	0.08	0.12
	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.18]	[0.19]
SomeCollege	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.10	0.08	-0.03	-0.06
	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.19]	[0.20]
College	-0.35**	-0.36**	-0.35**	-0.36**	-0.26+	-0.25+	-0.46*	-0.42*
	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.19]	[0.19]
age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02*	0.02*
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
age_sq	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Gender	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.08]
Hispanic	-0.20+	-0.22+	-0.20+	-0.22+	-0.09	-0.06	-0.24	-0.34*
	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.17]	[0.17]	[0.16]
NoHSXImm	0.45**	0.47**	0.44**	0.43**	0.08	0.35*	0.60**	0.52*
	[0.14]	[0.17]	[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.14]	[0.19]	[0.22]
HSXImm	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.39*	-0.10	-0.21
	[0.12]	[0.14]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.24]	[0.18]	[0.17]	[0.19]
SomeCollXImm	-0.10	-0.03	-0.10	-0.08	0.01	0.42**	-0.18	-0.24
	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.06]	[0.14]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.16]
CollXImm	-0.08	-0.02	-0.08	-0.06	-0.14	0.28+	-0.04	-0.16
	[0.11]	[0.13]	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.24]	[0.19]
NoHSXF1	-0.09	0.25	-0.09	0.24	0.27		-0.27	-0.57+
	[0.20]	[0.17]	[0.20]	[0.17]	[0.20]		[0.27]	[0.31]
HSXF1	-0.01	0.30*	-0.01	0.29*	-0.17	-0.54**	0.17	-0.17
	[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.29]	[0.20]	[0.16]	[0.18]
SomeColXF1	-0.04	0.24*	-0.04	0.22+	-0.04	-0.50**	-0.03	-0.35*
	[0.09]	[0.11]	[0.09]	[0.11]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.12]	[0.15]
ColXF1	0.22+	0.49**	0.22+	0.48**	0.31	-0.17	0.14	-0.20
	[0.12]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.14]	[0.19]	[0.11]	[0.24]	[0.25]
YearDummy	-0.03	-0.05						
	[0.07]	[0.09]						
Constant	-0.18	-0.03	-0.21	-0.17	-0.04	-0.20	-0.30	-0.47
	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.20]	[0.18]	[0.30]	[0.48]	[0.36]	[0.65]
Observations	2978	2978	2978	2978	1562	1562	1416	1413

Table 6: First 2 models replicate HSS; Second 2 models drop the time dummy. Final models estimate separately by year (1990 then 2000). Each model estimated without then with state fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets, $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

	1	2	3	4
HighSchool	1.32** [0.39]	1.28** [0.45]	1.32* [0.55]	1.28* [0.56]
SomeCollege	0.93** [0.15]	0.89** [0.22]	0.93+ [0.54]	0.89 [0.54]
College	0.52+ [0.30]	0.50 [0.33]	0.52 [0.55]	0.50 [0.54]
age	0.01 [0.03]	0.02 [0.04]	0.01 [0.04]	0.02 [0.04]
age_sq	-0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]	-0.00 [0.00]
Gender	0.02 [0.12]	-0.04 [0.09]	0.02 [0.19]	-0.04 [0.20]
Hispanic	0.87 [0.60]	0.84 [0.58]	0.87 [0.54]	0.84 [0.53]
HSXImm	-2.79** [0.80]		-2.79** [0.74]	
SomeCollXImm	-2.27** [0.55]	0.63 [0.49]	-2.27** [0.71]	0.63 [0.53]
CollXImm	-2.16** [0.67]	0.74** [0.23]	-2.16** [0.69]	0.74 [0.53]
YearDummy	2.56** [0.64]	0.14 [0.32]	2.56** [0.63]	0.14 [0.45]
NoHSXImm		3.21** [0.84]		3.21** [0.76]
Constant	0.46 [0.98]	10.07* [4.25]	0.46 [1.08]	10.07 [6.29]
Observations	201	201	201	201

Table 7: HSS Models For States That Changed Fiscal1 Status From 0 to 1. Models include only respondents from states that changed Fiscal1 score from 0 to 1 between 1990 and 2000. Models 1 and 2 cluster standard errors at state level, Models 3 and 4 do not cluster standard errors. Each model estimated without then with state fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets, $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

References

Hays, J., Ehrlich, S., and Peinhardt, C. (2005). Government spending and public support for trade in the oecd: An empirical test of the embedded liberalism thesis. *International Organization*, **59**(2), 473–494.