

Sailing the Water's Edge: Where Domestic Politics Meets Foreign Policy

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 - ▶ Wildavsky 1966, Sigelman 1979, Edwards 1989, Fleisher and Bond 2000; Canes-Wrone 2006, 2008.

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 - ▶ Wildavsky 1966, Sigelman 1979, Edwards 1989, Fleisher and Bond 2000; Canes-Wrone 2006, 2008.
- ▶ IPE and Security: Policy Instruments studied separately.
 - ▶ Hiscox 2002, Frieden 1991, Pevehouse and Howell 2007.
- ▶ We question all of these.

US Foreign Policy

- ▶ Countries have many FP instruments they can use.
 - ▶ foreign aid, trade agreements, military intervention, sanctions, propaganda, military aid, immigration quotas, etc.
- ▶ Ex: Iran. Big debate over sanctions, military force, covert activities.
- ▶ Ex: North Korea. Sanctions, aid, trade, military force all considered; some used.
- ▶ Ex: “Wary of committing a large number of troops, the United States has sought to use more diplomatic and development tools than military force in Africa.”

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- ▶ Ex: “Wary of committing a large number of troops, the United States has sought to use more diplomatic and development tools than military force in Africa.”
- ▶ FP instruments can be used as substitutes, complements. Need to be considered together.
- ▶ How and why are they chosen? And by whom?

Two Presidencies Debate

- ▶ President has much more influence in FP than DP.
- ▶ President heavily constrained by Congress, Interest Groups, and Public in DP.
- ▶ President with much more discretion in FP.
- ▶ Does Politics Stop at the Water's Edge? Yes for them. No for us.

Presidential Power: Why and When does President have Influence over Foreign Policy?

First Step in Argument: The President has to get Congress to vote for his preferred foreign policy.

- ▶ The public believes the President has an informational advantage in foreign policy issues.
- ▶ But only on some FP issues, and it is those most closely linked to national security policy that they believe he does.

Information Asymmetry Hypothesis: President has advantage over Congress in some areas because he is seen by public to be more informed.

New Survey Data

Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk)

- ▶ Fielded in past two weeks, concurrent with (basically identical) YouGov/Polimetrix poll
- ▶ 2000 mTurkers
- ▶ 20 minute survey, \$2.50

Can compare basic covariates from mTurk to 2010 CCES.

Survey Question: Information Generally

“The US government can use a variety of different policy tools in pursuing foreign policy. These tools include the use of the US military, trade policy, and foreign aid. Foreign aid can be economic aid or military aid. The following questions will ask you to indicate whether the US president or your Congressperson has more information on when and how each policy tool should be used. Please check the box next to the person you feel is more informed.”




Figure: Congressperson or President more informed about policy?
Percent indicating President knows more.




Figure: President or Congress knows more about impact on district.

	<i>Sample Coverage</i>	<i>Vote Grouping</i>	<i>DV</i>	<i>Key IV</i>
Analysis 1	Universe of Foreign Policy Votes 1953-2008	Security vs. Non-Security	Own Party and Total Vote Margin (Y-N)	Pres. Position Yea vs. Nay or Y/Abstain/N X Security Dummy
Analysis 2	Sub-sample 223 House votes 208 Senate votes	Security vs. Non-security	Individual Leg. Vote (1 if pro-policy)	Pres. Position/Pres. Pa X Security Dummy
Analysis 3	Sub-sample 223 House/208 Senate	Separate Policy Domains	Individual Leg. Vote (1 if pro-policy)	Pres. Position/Pres. Pa District variables

Table: Types of roll call data used in analysis.

Structure of Discussion

- 1) describe sample and results
- 2) discuss inference problems

Analysis 3

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IV: 1 if Prez takes pro-intl position and party of President. 0 otherwise. [► Details](#)

Cluster SE at legislator level. Vote fixed effects.




Figure: House: Change in probability of voting in favor of policy domain, changing Presidential position variable from 0 to 1.




Figure: Senate: Change in probability of voting in favor of policy domain, changing Presidential position variable from 0 to 1.

Many Control Variables

District skill levels

District or legislator ideology

PAC contributions

Foreign born

Agricultural production

Region fixed effects

District military spending (via GIS and contracts database) and base personnel

Don't change results. [▶ Other Analyses](#)

Inference Concerns

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What we worry about:

- ▶ Only identifies the effects on co-partisans
- ▶ Omitted legislator specific variables (no legislator FE's)

Additional Evidence

Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008 JOP

Original Analysis

- ▶ President gets closer to what he asks for in foreign affairs vs. domestic
- ▶ President has more control over foreign affairs bureaucracies

Our Analysis

- ▶ Results only hold for security budgets/agencies

Conclusion

- ▶ 2 Key Implications
- ▶ First, US engagement depends on presidential influence.
 - ▶ President has different preferences from many legislators.
 - ▶ President is more interested in international engagement; median legislator is less favorable.
 - ▶ Ability to form coalitions of support around combinations of different policy tools will vary. Different tools have different constituencies.

Conclusion

- ▶ Second, **Militarization** of FP
 - ▶ It is more difficult for president to influence some forms of FP, esp. those connected to domestic politics.
 - ▶ Aid, immigration, IMF, trade harder to influence than military aid and deployments, even though less costly.
 - ▶ President potentially more likely to use FP instruments that are easier to employ.
 - ▶ Overuse of these military instruments possible; that is, they are used when they are not always most appropriate for international problem.

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Analysis 1

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Analysis 1	Universe of Foreign Policy Votes 1953-2008	Security vs. Non-Security	Own Party and Total Vote Margin (Y-N)	Pres. Position Yea vs. Nay or Y/Abstain/N X Security Dummy

Estimate with OLS

$$\text{VoteMargin} = \text{SecurityVote} + \text{PresidentialPosition} + \text{SecurityVote} * \text{PresidentialPosition} + \text{controls}$$

Use session or President fixed effects; including or excluding procedural votes. Including votes where there was abstention gives larger sample size.

► Other Analyses

	S4
SecurityVsNonSecurity	26.12** [5.706]
PresSupportAbstainOppose	129.5** [36.65]
PresSAO X Security	46.56** [11.76]
PresPopularity	0.442 [0.382]
PrezSAOPopularity	-1.101+ [0.565]
Constant	68.36* [28.29]
Observations	3895

Standard errors in brackets

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table: President Own Party Yea-Nay as Dependent Variable, Trichotomous Presidential Position IV, session FE's.

	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
main						
PresSupportVsOppose	199.4** [51.34]	73.21 [64.14]	0.237 [0.838]			
Security	-25.52+ [13.63]	-81.01** [20.91]	-0.784** [0.136]	23.07** [5.720]	41.89** [9.680]	41.46** [9.657]
Security_PrezPositionYVSN	32.78 [20.02]	90.81** [30.42]	0.576** [0.195]			
Non-Security	-2.352 [12.72]	-45.58** [13.48]	-0.370** [0.101]	-4.872 [7.073]	-10.24 [11.82]	-12.43 [11.76]
NonSecurity_PrezPositionYVSN	-33.21 [20.00]	14.78 [20.78]	0.618** [0.186]			
PresSupportAbstainOppose				132.0** [29.97]	56.25* [23.21]	53.48* [24.90]
Security_PrezPositionTri				28.52* [11.55]	70.62** [17.80]	72.19** [17.51]
NonSecurity_PrezPositionTri				-17.75 [10.55]	8.367 [11.70]	11.08 [11.51]
PresPopularity	0.950+ [0.548]	0.243 [0.615]	-0.00421 [0.00623]	0.496* [0.180]	0.488 [0.460]	0.782* [0.334]
PrezPosPopularity	-0.499 [0.774]	-0.141 [1.000]	-0.000354 [0.0130]			
PrezSAOPopularity				-0.790+ [0.447]	-0.490 [0.353]	-0.470 [0.375]
Constant	-77.84* [35.19]	123.8** [41.03]	1.626** [0.404]	64.92** [13.69]	163.4** [36.05]	107.1** [26.81]
Observations	3597	3597	3594	16704	16704	16704

Standard errors in brackets

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table: Analysis 1 including domestic votes (excluded category). D1 and D2 exclude absentions, D3-D4 include. D1 and D3 use own party vote share, D2, D4, and D5 use overall vote margins. D1-D4 use session FE, D5 uses Presidential FS's.

Inference Concerns

What we aren't worried about:

- ▶ With session/President FE's, we can control for specific constellations of Congressional/President preferences
- ▶ Results robust to using only votes where position taken and all votes. Strategic abstention concerns less unless endogeneity story can explain both sets of results
- ▶ If also include domestic policy votes and estimate relative to these, results also hold.

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What we worry about:

- ▶ Strategic position taking by Presidents conditional on expectations of voting behavior (Presidents take positions in directions they think they'll be followed on).
 - ▶ Unclear why these expectations should systematically differ across security vs. non-security FP votes.
- ▶ When DV is president wins or not, difference between Security and Non-Security does not hold.

Analysis 2

	<i>Sample Coverage</i>	<i>Vote Grouping</i>	<i>DV</i>	<i>Key IV</i>
Analysis 2	Sub-sample 223 House votes 208 Senate votes	Security vs. Non-security	Individual Leg. Vote (1 if pro-policy)	Pres. Position/Pres. Party X Security Dummy

<i>Security</i>	<i>Non-security</i>
Authorization/funding for military deployments in conflict areas	Trade legislation
Military aid	Immigration (visas/benefits/employer regs.)
Country specific economic aid/Economic Support Fund	Development aid
Immigration border control/enforcement	Food aid
	Final passage of the Foreign Operations and Export Financing bill

Table: Classification of policy domains by security and non-security content.

Estimate with probit or linear probability model

$$ProVote = SecurityVote + PresidentProPartyPrez + SecurityVote * PresidentProPartyPrez + legislator/district\ controls$$

Estimate without and with legislator fixed effects (LPM only)/cluster SE at legislator level

	House2
PrezSupport	0.300** [0.0221]
PrezXSecurity	0.376** [0.0259]
SecurityVote	-0.173** [0.0140]
Observations	80282

Table: Model House 2. Panel probit. Standard errors in brackets,
 $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$




Figure: Change in probability of voting in pro-policy direction moving from non-security to security vote, conditional on President taking a pro-position, using model House2.

Inference Concerns

What we aren't worried about:

- ▶ Omitted district and legislator variables (at least compared to most Presidential studies that don't control for any!)
- ▶ In legislator FE's models effects identified off of within legislator deviations. If some legislators are more likely to be influenced by the President, we deal with this.

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What we worry about:

- ▶ Only identifies the effects on co-partisans
- ▶ Presidents only take pro-positions when they expect others will take pro-position
 - ▶ Unclear why this expectation should systematically differ across security versus non-security votes (perhaps differential expectations of media coverage?).

Presidential positions

Category	% Pro	% Anti	% Abstained	<i>N</i>
Final Passage Aid	9.1	4.5	86.4	22
General Aid	63.2	0	36.8	19
Food Aid	20	0	80	5
Bilateral Aid	54.2	0	45.8	24
Military Aid	31.8	4.5	63.6	22
Military Deployment	37.9	6.9	55.2	29
IMF	44.4	11.1	44.4	9
Trade	86.7	0	13.3	30
Immigration	11.1	20.6	68.3	63

Table: Presidential positions by category.

Multilateralism and Policy Substitution

- ▶ Countries have a choice when engaging between multilateralism and bilateralism.
 - ▶ Milner/Tingley (2012) looks at reasons for multilateralism.
 - ▶ Can Presidents choose between two easily? Substitution?
 - ▶ No, partisan politics around multilateralism is difficult.
 - ▶ E.g., votes in IMF and WB opposed by conservative groups/legislators and not subject to much presidential influence.
 - ▶ Does this lead to tendency to go bilateral?
- ▶ Policy Substitution between ML and BL limited by domestic politics.




Figure: Pre-1945 Spending

Example Categories for Analysis of Vote Margins

Security (Rohde category number in ())

- ▶ Air Force funding (116)
- ▶ Military aid (145)
- ▶ SALT 2 (465)

Non security

- ▶ International Organizations (143)
- ▶ Foreign Loans (402)
- ▶ State Department (430)

Note, security categorization does include votes on things like B2 bomber and other defense related economic activity.

Policy Domain	Presidential Position			Total
	Oppose	Abstain	Support	
Non-Sec FP	14.8	68.7	16.5	100.0
Sec FP	15.6	75.7	8.7	100.0
Domestic	9.5	80.0	10.4	100.0
Total	10.9	78.5	10.6	100.0

Table: Presidential position taking by policy area.